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ABSTRACT 
 
Hosny, Khaled H., Masters: January : 2018, Master of Accounting 
Title: Board Diversity and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from the United Kingdom 
Supervisor ofThesis: Dr. Adel Elgharbawy. 
This study examines the relationship between board diversity and firms’ 
performance in the UK by examining cross-sectional data for 2013–2016 from the 
Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 350 companies. Board diversity was measured 
by gender diversity, background and skills, and board tenure. Performance was measured 
by Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q using two regression models.    
The study revealed mixed results. Performance, as measured by both proxies, had 
a positive association with gender diversity, a negative association with background and 
skills, and mixed results with board tenure. Tobin’s Q revealed a non-significant 
relationship with board tenure diversity, whereas ROA had a positive association. 
Regarding the control variables, board size and number of meetings had positive 
association with performance, whereas firm size and level of leverage had negative 
association with performance. The presence of a corporate governance committee and a 
nomination committee had positive association with Tobin’s Q model but not with ROA, 
while executive members’ gender diversity had a positive association with the ROA but 
not with Tobin’s Q.  
This study provides useful insights into the importance of board diversity and its 
implications for firm performance, which can help develop future regulations and policies, 
such as having a quota of women on the board. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Many of the current existing academic literature on board diversity argues that the 
low levels of board diversity within different contexts across different company sectors is 
a significant concern with respect to ethical and economical perspectives (Grosvold, 
Brammer, & Rayton, 2007). An important element of the literature has argued that it is 
highly unethical for certain groups of people to be denied access to social power on the 
basis of their gender, religion, race, background, or any other individual traits that are 
totally unrelated to their abilities (Garratt, 1997; Keasey, Thompson, & Wright, 1997; 
Carver 2002). In fact, the literature argues that the society in general and companies in 
particular would benefit by better reflecting their shareholders and customers through 
increasing their board’s gender diversity. In other words, companies should perceive board 
diversity as an opportunity for growth rather than a means to an end (Grosvold et al., 2007). 
Besides, if any segment of society’s talent is systematically excluded from boards of 
directors for reasons that are unrelated to their abilities or talents, the company’s board is 
therefore sub-optimal (Burke, 1997; Cassell, 2000; Carver, 2002). Furthermore, if the 
necessary talents, abilities, and competencies are not evenly distributed across 
demographic groups, companies are, in fact, missing out on some of the main resources by 
limiting their selections to men (or a particular race, religion or background) (Bryan, 1995; 
Burke, 2000; Westphal & Milton, 2000).  
From a firms’ perspective, an economic incentive for a more diversified boardroom 
is that diversity should reflect its stakeholders’ constituencies better. From one perspective, 
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customers will feel that their demands and requirements are better handled by somebody 
with whom they can identify, whether they are related by gender or ethnicity (Bilimoria & 
Wheeler, 2000). From another perspective, employees will also be motivated if they see a 
better reflection of themselves in the board of directors (Powell, 1999). In fact, firms that 
are dedicated to incorporating these issues may reap economic benefits and achieve better 
relationships with their pressure groups and investors (Kuczynski, 1999; Carver, 2002; 
Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003).  
At the tactical level, boardroom diversity has been viewed from two different 
angles. One side considers the increase in performance (Mattis, 2000; Selby, 2000; van der 
Walt & Ingley, 2003); the other side considers diversity increases conflict, which delays 
the decision-making process but hampers group-think (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996; 
Knight et al., 1999; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003).  
Slow decision-making processes have, to some extent, been attributed to female 
board members. This is because women’s decisions are felt to be marginal to the board’s 
decision-making process. This, in turn, is translated into women feeling unable to voice 
their valuable contributions, which they were originally elected to do. Within a more 
diverse range of opinions and thoughts within the boardroom, consensus may be even 
harder to achieve, which causes delays in decision-making and devolves personal 
responsibility (Hambrick et al., 1996; Knight et al., 1999; Erhardt et al., 2003).  
It is evident that boardroom performance will be affected by the experiences, 
competencies, skills, and views of its members (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004). Therefore, the 
wider the pool of talents from which board members are selected, the more capable the 
board should be. It has been argued that board diversity adds more to the company than it 
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takes away, and it increases rather than decreases the board’s decision-making ability and 
the company’s performance as a whole (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004). Therefore, one of the 
motivations of this study is to investigate this relationship. The study also aims to help 
policy-makers in future developments regarding board diversity within the corporate 
governance code in the UK. 
1.2 Research Problem and Question 
There is no widespread consensus on whether a company should diversify its board 
of directors, or whether board diversity positively or negatively affects firms’ performance. 
This study also raises the question of which factors should a company consider in order to 
benefit from board diversity, if it exists in the first place (Martin et al., 2008). The sought-
after influence of diversity on performance is important, as it is one of the factors that affect 
a company’s continuity and going concerns. As a result, this study should help in answering 
the following research question of “What is the effect of board diversity in terms of gender, 
background and skills, and board tenure on the overall performance of a firm?”  
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
The research aims to investigate the effect of board diversity on firm performance. 
In order to achieve this aim, the study has to achieve the following objectives.  
I. Investigate the effect of board gender diversity on firm performance; 
II. Investigate the effect of board tenure on firm performance; 
III. Investigate the effect of background diversity on firm performance. 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no previous studies have examined all 
of these relationships, except Martin et al. (2008), who studied board gender diversity as 
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one dimension of board diversity. Therefore, this study attempts to address this gap in the 
literature.   
1.4 Research Contribution 
Board diversity issues are closely related to a company’s performance and its 
implications. Therefore, studying board diversity will add to the literature by explaining 
the presence of the interrelationship between diversity and performance from four different 
dimensions across a wide time interval from 2013 to 2016. In fact, this study could be used 
as a base for other future research that addresses similar topics even outside the UK, 
especially for countries that share similar economic characteristics to the UK. In addition, 
the importance of gender diversity, in particular, is highly relevant because of the pressure 
groups that have been asking for equality in rights between men and women since 1999 
(Carter et al., 2003; Carver, 2002; Kuczynski, 1999). Therefore, studying gender diversity 
would definitely attract such stakeholders. 
In addition, this study links boardroom diversity to performance by using the 
resource dependency theory. This will broaden our understanding of the multiple aspects 
of board diversity, instead of only focusing on gender diversity, and relate them to firm 
performance. The study provides useful insights for decision-makers in the business about 
who to hire in the boardroom and from which gender, background, age, race, and origin. 
More importantly, this study examines the effect of a new variable to the literature, namely 
the gender diversity of the executive members. To the best of our knowledge, this variable 
has not been considered before in any previous study. Therefore, it is expected that by the 
end of this study, more insights into board structure and, in particular, the demographic 
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characteristics represented by gender, will be better understood, along with its implications 
for firm performance.  
1.5 Thesis Structure 
The rest of the study consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 contains the literature 
review, which presents previous studies that examined the relationship between board 
diversity and firm performance. Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical framework and 
explains the pathway that has been selected to hypothesize the relationships investigated 
in this study.  Chapter 4 is the methodology chapter, which discusses the rationalization of 
the study and its context, followed by the variable measurements and the data collection 
process. Chapter 5 contains the data analysis and a discussion, in which the descriptive 
statistics, Pearson’s correlations, and linear regression analysis are explained. Finally, in 
the final chapter, the study summarizes, concludes and discusses the practical implications 
for regulations and policy-making, as well as directions for future studies.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction  
The boardroom members are the stewards of the internal corporate governance 
hierarchy and thus it is considered as the highest authoritative body in any firm (Lorsch, 
1995).  The concept of having a board of directors has emerged since the separation of 
ownership and control, and it is now universally accepted that every organization, 
regardless of its size or vocation, ought to be run under the direction and control of a board 
of directors (Lorsch, 1995). The roles of the boardroom include but are not limited to: 
dealing with crises; communicating with shareholders, capital allocation, and decisions; 
acting as an intermediary between managers and agents; and selecting, compensating, 
assessing, and replacing the chief executive officer (CEO). Therefore, the importance of 
having a sound board of directors is driven by the fact that the boardroom shapes corporate 
leadership and sets the tone and the culture at the top level of management, which 
influences corporate financial performance.  
The importance of the boardroom (board of directors) and its influence on a firm’s 
performance is reflected in the diversity in the gender, background and skills, and board 
tenure of the members at the boardroom level, which, in turn, provides many different 
resources that are critically important for a company’s success.  Therefore, it could be 
concluded that the importance of the boardroom is highly correlated with a firm’s 
performance and that therefore, the board’s effectiveness and efficiency are crucial aspects 
that should be highlighted in order for the boardroom to successfully do what it has to do. 
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In the next section of this study, the definition, history, and advantages of board diversity 
will be elaborated. 
2.2 Definition of Board Diversity  
Before discussing the rest of the study, it is important to define what is meant by 
diversity. The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (2018) has defined diversity 
in their curriculum as “aiming to cultivate a broad spectrum of demographic attributes and 
characteristics in the boardroom”. The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
mentioned a few examples that included board gender diversity as one of the hot topics 
that is being investigated nowadays. However, the Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants also provided an opportunity to incorporate more examples of board diversity. 
Harrison & Klein (2007) defined diversity as a unit-level construct that refers to “the 
distribution of differences among the members of a unit with respect to a common attribute, 
X”. As an example, a board of directors (the unit X) may be more or less diverse in terms 
of nationality, functional expertise, gender, or education level. This definition introduces 
different dimensions of diversity that could be studied and their relationship to 
performance; the variables addressed in this study are no exception (gender, background 
and skills, and tenure). 
When considering diversity, one should consider the work of Basaglio (2012), who 
made an important distinction between representation and skills. This is because the 
majority of the arguments for diversity consider benefits that are solely based on the merits 
of representation, for example, minority representation. However, in fact, diversity needs 
to be reviewed on the basis of skills. Individuals who travel along different career paths, 
coming from different backgrounds and gaining unique life experiences gain skills that 
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have to be represented in the boardroom in the current competitive environment. It is 
important to shed light on the fact that boardroom members are deemed to be the leaders 
who cause either success or failure for the companies they work for. This is because they 
are the ones who create the strategy, vision, and mission of a firm.  
2.3 Board Diversity History in the UK 
Board diversity is a key driver of board effectiveness. Headworth, Nelson, and 
Wilkins (2016) argue that when the board is composed of people from different 
backgrounds with a varying range of skills and experiences, this introduces diversity from 
a background and skills perspective, which, in turn, helps in promoting the long-term 
success of an organization in the highly competitive marketplace. Diversity in the 
workforce is primarily focused on the idea of including more women in organizational 
boards (Sajjad & Rashid, 2015). Initially, most companies did not have women in their 
workforce, let alone their boards, and this was dictated by the view that women could not 
perform at the same level as men. Over the years, this expanded to include other aspects of 
diversity that are bound to exist within the workforce (Baker & Anderson, 2010). Diversity 
in board composition is a factor that could be argued to date back to the implementation of 
the Employment Rights Act of 1996.  The law outlawed hiring practices that discriminated 
board members on the basis of their nationality, religion, race, or gender (Baker & 
Anderson, 2010).  This was later followed by the Equality Act of 2010. The economic 
global crisis in 2007 led to increasingly varied challenges being faced by boards in most 
organizations today, and this increased the focus on board diversity and the role that it 
could play in improving board performance. Over the years, UK boards have consistently 
been moving towards what could be regarded as best practices in relation to board diversity. 
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Diversity of boards, in this particular respect, is used to refer to the dissimilarities in board 
attributes. Much research has been conducted over the years trying to determine the 
relationship between board diversity and firm effectiveness (Campbell & Mínguez-vera, 
2008; Rhode & Packel, 2014; Foster, 2008; Wellalage & Locke, 2013). Most of the 
findings from the research seem to point to the fact that most of the firms with a high level 
of board diversity seem to perform better than organizations that have low levels of 
diversity among their board members (Mishra & Jhunjhunwala, 2013).  
Board diversity is desirable in organizations for two key reasons. First, diversity is 
generally desired by customers and other key stakeholders who are crucial for the success 
of the firms. As such, ensuring a high level of diversity within the firm could lead to crucial 
benefits for the success of the firm (Hafsi & Turgut, 2013). Second, board diversity helps 
in the generation of new and different ideas within the organization, which, in the long run, 
is a key determinant of an organization’s performance (Orbach, 2017).  
Board diversity is a high priority for institutional investors in the UK. However, 
there have been concerns that this message may not be getting to the boardroom because 
of the differing opinions among the directors on exactly what diversity within the 
workplace entails (Hafsi & Turgut, 2013). Over the years, the UK government has been 
keen on seeing more diverse boards. In February 2011, Lord Davies of Abersoch set a 
target for board gender diversity for FTSE 100 companies, and part of the new regulations 
included how each of the companies must ensure 25% female representation in their boards 
by the year 2015. As per GrantThornton (2016), the target for most of the companies is to 
ensure that by 2020, each of the companies must have at least 33% female representation. 
The other aspect of diversity is cultural and ethnic inclusion in the boards. The rules in the 
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UK stipulate that all of the boards of FTSE 100 companies should have at least one person 
of color to ensure improved diversity in their management team by the year 2021 and for 
FTSE3 350 by the year 2024 (GrantThornton, 2016).  
In the next sections in this chapter, the study will discuss two main themes. The 
first one explores the main advantages and definitions of board diversity in general. The 
second theme addresses the separate dimensions of board diversity, namely board gender 
diversity, board background and skills, and board tenure.  
 
2.4 Advantages of Board Diversity  
On one hand, some have questioned the effective impact of diversity on the overall 
performance of companies. The advantages and disadvantages of diversity in general have 
been addressed in the literature. According to Hafsi and Turgut (2013), the effect of board 
diversity on corporate social performance is significant. The study of Hafsi and Turgut 
(2013) formulated three different hypotheses for testing the relationship of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) with board diversity. Their dimensions were: board size, leadership 
duality, gender, age, experience, ethnicity, number of outside board members, and the 
ownership of outside board members in relation to other boards. The study’s conclusion 
was not comprehensive and cannot be generalized.  This is because the testing was done 
on only one set of data representing the year 2005 with a random sample of 100 companies 
listed in the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index. Their random selection did not represent 
the actual population, as the time interval selected and the number of companies were small 
to be used for generalization to the wider population. A similar study conducted in 
Australia examined the relationship between board diversity and CSR reporting by Rao 
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and Tilt (2016) among the top 150 listed companies over a 3-year period. The results were 
similar to those of Hafsi and Turgut (2013), indicating that gender, tenure, and multiple 
directorships have significant potential for influencing CSR reporting.  
As a result of this discussion, it can be concluded that board diversity has a positive 
influence on CSR. In other words, the more diversified the boardroom, the higher the CSR. 
This represents one of the advantages of having a diversified board of directors. 
If we consider social performance as one of the advantages, the results of the study 
of Siciliano (1996), which was conducted on YMCA organizations for the year 1989 using 
resource dependency theory, suggests that gender diversity was positively linked with a 
firm’s level of social performance but negatively linked with the level of funds raised. In 
fact, this result was supported by Carter et al. (2003) in their research testing the 
relationship between board diversity and company value for Fortune 1000 companies. In 
fact, Carter et al. (2003) found a significant positive link between a company’s value and 
female representation on the board.  
Another advantage was highlighted by Ooi, Hooy, and Mat Som (2017), who 
identified board diversity and its relationship to human capital and social capital during 
crisis periods and its effect on financial performance. Although they found no significant 
improvement in firm performance, diversity significantly mitigated the negative impact of 
a crisis affecting firm performance. The advantage lies in the ability of a diverse board to 
mitigate the impact of crisis, and the study shows that board diversity in external network 
ties is effective for handling gradual crises. The dimensions of diversity that were found to 
be significant were: educational background, work experience, and external networks. 
Their over results were inconclusive, as their conclusions indicated that board diversity 
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only affects performance as measured by stock prices and not accounting performance 
(measured by profits). These results might raise a different question about whether stock 
price is a reliable measurement of a firm’s performance.  
An additional advantage that was elaborated by Li et al. (2018) is that board 
diversity, in fact, has a significantly positive effect on employer–employee relationships 
(EERs). Li et al. (2018) also claimed that a positive impact on EER may be useful for 
increasing a firm’s performance. As a result, the impact of board diversity on a firm’s 
financial performance could be indirect.  Although Li et al (2018) did not explicitly test the 
proposed indirect relationship, the advantage here is mainly attributed to the board diversity 
and its impact on EERs. This present study did not find a continuation of Li et al.’s (2018) 
study to determine the exact impact of EER on firm performance.  
Furthermore, a study by Buse, and Bernstien and Bilmoria (2016) tested board 
diversity and its influence on the board’s performance. The study found that the presence 
of female members in the boardroom directly affects the policies and practices of the board, 
which consequently affect the board’s performance. Similarly, Pechersky (2016) found that 
board diversity in general and board gender diversity in particular make contributions 
towards a firm’s performance in social and healthcare industries.  
Ferreira (2010) has also highlighted another benefit of board diversity in general 
where it increases creativity when having people from different background with different 
life experiences who are likely to approach similar or even different problems in more 
creative ways. Ferreira has also stated that the more the diversified the boardroom was the 
lesser the boardroom suffers from group thinking problems. 
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This study believes that the advantages of board diversity have more than one 
dimension to be addressed and not only those mentioned above. For example, a study 
conducted in Vietnam by Hoang, Abeysekera and Ma (2017) found a significant 
relationship between board diversity and its impact on earnings quality. Therefore, it can 
be argued that board diversity does not only tie in with performance but, in fact, it can 
affect multiple factors that could be studied. Hence, it can be seen that diversity in general 
has advantages that have been made theoretically and empirically evident over the years. 
The literature indicates that board diversity has numerous advantages, and this helped to 
drive and shape the current study.   
The next section in the literature review is divided into two main themes, where 
each part discusses the three attributes of board diversity in either of developed or 
developing countries. 
2.5 Developed Countries 
2.5.1 Gender Diversity 
The board gender diversity dimension was not addressed widely in the UK, since 
female representation at the boardroom level has been considerably low until recent years. 
Martin et al. (2008) is an example of the studies written on this topic in this context, but it 
is not the only one to consider. FTSE 100 companies between 2000 and 2005 had only 
10.5% female directors on their boards of directors (Singh & Vinnicombe, 2005). Although 
the number of female directors has doubled across 2000 to 2005, the percentage is still 
considered to be low (Brammer, Millington, & Pavelin, 2007). According to Brammer et 
al. (2007), female representation was significant in those types of companies that deal 
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directly with the customers at the lower level of management of the company, with less 
presence of the senior level management, such as the  boardroom directors.  
Martin et al. (2008) examined board gender diversity differently, with his study 
mainly exploring the trend of hiring female directors in the boardroom and the percentage 
of women occupying vacancies. His findings were that male directors are still dominating 
boardrooms except for small and service companies, where female directors are present in 
greater numbers. This was highlighted earlier by Martin et al. (2008), who reported a lack 
of disaggregated data and information in the UK reporting corporate board diversity. The 
main findings of Martin et al.’s (2008) study concerned female representation, where they 
expected that gender balance in the board of directors could be achieved by the year 2225 
at the earliest if progress kept improving at the same rate. 
In order to better understand the real impact of board gender diversity on firm 
performance, we will examine this relationship in details by reviewing prior literature that 
addressed this topic.  
Board gender diversity has been widely studied regarding its relationship with firm 
performance worldwide. Previous literature has provided divergent results when it comes 
to the influence of board gender diversity and its relationship with firm performance. The 
first reason is the inconsistency in the proxies used for measuring performance. The second 
reason is the context itself and, finally, the time interval and the different combinations of 
independent variables considered in the study have led to the inconclusive results.  Here, 
we will consider three main themes, starting with the positive influence of gender diversity 
in the boardroom on firm performance (measured by net income, Tobin’s Q, Return on 
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sales (ROS), return on equity (ROE), and return on assets (ROA)), followed by negative 
associations, and, lastly non-significant relationships.  
Smith, Smith, and Verner (2006) studied boardroom gender diversification in the 
context of 2500 Danish firms across the years from 1993 to 2001 by using a cross-sectional 
methodology. They examined relationship of gender diversity with firm performance and 
found a positive significant interrelationship between these variables. Smith et al. (2006) 
measured firm performance by using net income.  
In the context of the Far East, including Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore, 
Low, Roberts, and Whiting (2015) studied gender diversity relationship with performance 
and found that there is a positive relationship between board gender diversity and firm 
performance as measured by return on equity (ROE). However, they mentioned that, this 
positive relationship is only applicable when there is little female economic participation 
and empowerment. In other words, the relationship is positive when the female 
representation is minimal compared with the percentage of male board members. 
With respect to gender diversity and its relationship with Tobin’s Q, a study 
(Gordini & Rancati, 2017) that was conducted in the Italian context revealed that the 
percentage of women in the boardroom has a positive and significant effect on Tobin’s Q; 
however, it has an insignificant effect on financial performance (e.g. net income and 
profits). The inconsistency in the results for net income, profits, and Tobin’s Q is explained 
by the nature of measuring the Tobin’s Q variable, which considers the ratio of current 
value to the book value of the entity at the same point in time. 
In contrast to Gordini and Rancati (2017) study, Vob (2015) revealed that the 
relationship between board gender diversity and a firm’s performance in general was not 
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significant in the context of Norway, where Tobin’s Q in particular was found to have a 
negative association with firm performance. This is, into some extent, different from what 
other literature found during the same time interval. A possible reason is that the context 
addressed was different.  
Finally, a study that was conducted by Terjesen, Couto, and Francisco (2016) 
studied the same relationship between board gender diversity and the performance of 3876 
companies in 47 countries. The sample included all types of companies in terms of their 
size, value, geographical location, ownership structure, and nature. The study revealed that 
there is a positive relationship between board gender diversity and the board’s 
effectiveness, which could directly enhance the firm’s performance. Although there was 
no direct relationship between performance and gender diversity in Terjesen et al.’s (2016) 
study, they highlighted the indirect relationship between them implicitly. Similarly, Rose 
(2007) studied the context of Germany and did not find any linkage between female 
representation and the firm’s performance. However, Rose’s (2007) study period covered 
1998 to 2001 and it excluded financial institutions, and no linkage was discovered.  
In conclusion, board gender diversity and its impact on firm performance has been 
marginally addressed in the UK context. Martin et al.’s (2008) study, which is considered 
the closest study to this present study, covered the time interval of 2000–2005, which is 
now considered to be outdated. In the dynamic environment that firms are operating in, a 
study with a data from even only a few years ago is deemed to be outdated. In addition, the 
study only considered FTSE 100 companies, which does not represent the whole 
population. The main reason for the assumption that FSTE 100 companies are not 
representative is that Financial Times website published an article showing the variations 
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in the FTSE 100 index from 2000 to 2005, questioning whether measuring performance in 
this period is recommended, especially given the dramatic fluctuations taking place at the 
same time in the market (Evans, 2015). Although previous literature has studied the link 
between firm performance and gender diversity, the data were not up to date and did not 
cover the same context (the UK). Siciliano’s (1996) study, which addressed YMCA 
organizations, is somewhat old, as it covers the year 1996 and did not focus on one 
particular country. This was also the case for Carter et al. (2003), who addressed Fortune 
1000 companies in the United States in 2003. This literature review has highlighted the 
wide gap of studies in the UK. Rose (2007) studied his context; however, her methodology 
for collecting data is still questionable. Rose (2007) managed to obtain the data for data 
analysis manually, which is sometimes inaccurate, leading to incorrect analysis, 
interpretations, and conclusions accordingly. Kiliç and Kuzey’s (2016) study addressed the 
period of 2008 to 2012 in Turkey and looked at the companies listed on Borsa Istanbul. 
The study only focused on board gender diversity, ignoring other significant factors 
affecting firm performance from the board diversity perspective.  This study follows the 
same methodology of adopting the resource dependency theory that was used by Kiliç and 
Kuzey in Turkey (details of the methodology will be presented in the next chapter). 
Therefore, it can be said that board gender diversity has been studied in different 
context regarding its relationship with other factors not limited to firm’s performance. This 
highlights the importance of gender diversity in the literature and in this study in particular.  
2.5.2 Background and Skills Diversity 
The educational background and skills of the management has remained a puzzle 
as to whether it affects a firm’s performance or not. This factor has been the least examined 
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or studied by researchers according to Protasovs (2015). Notwithstanding, many authors 
have agreed upon the effect of diversity in background and skills on firm performance. 
According to Murray (1989), it has a non-significant relationship with the firm’s 
performance in the short-term; however, the need to have a particular background is strong 
for a firm in that particular industry. A brief example considered a board full of engineers 
for a company operating in the oil and gas industry. Ensuring this type of background 
experience in the board would lead to better a company performance overall. In contrast to 
Murray (1989), a study by Argenti (1976) found that a board of directors without adequate 
diversity in educational background could lead to the collapse of a firm. The author relied 
on an example in 1970s when Rolls-Royce went through a downturn because its board was 
dominated by engineers with little knowledge and minimal experience of the financial 
implications of the company’s research and development. Hence, this makes educational 
background and skills diversity a crucial aspect for a board of directors, particularly for 
large organizations in our modern business world. In addition, Bantel (1993) found more 
benefits of having a more educationally diversified board, which helps firms to make better 
decisions in the long run. The results of Bantel (1993) were based on the banking sector 
and the financial industry as a whole. Similarly, having more a educationally diverse board 
helps the company to make faster and more in-depth assessments of decisions as well as 
addressing the potential information asymmetry issues between the senior management and 
the board of directors (Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, & Hanuman, 2012). Mahadeo et al. (2012) 
also found a significant effect of diversified board background regarding its impact on firm 
performance. Therefore, it can be seen that these factors are significantly relevant in 
measuring board diversity and affect firm performance.  
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The structure of the board of directors plays an important role in how the board 
monitors the managers and controls the company on behalf of the shareholders. The 
structure comprises CEO duality, the existence of board committees, and the presence of 
non-executive representation on the board (Chuanrommanee & Swierczek, 2007). 
However, the way in which the diversity of the board was defined in this study was based 
on educational background and skills, gender, and board tenure, which are considered to 
be the main governance issues in the modern business world (Carter et al., 2003). Gender, 
background and skills, and tenure aspects of diversity are taken into account because many 
institutions, including the National Association of Corporate Directors’ Blue Ribbon 
Commission and the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, suggest not only 
considering the abovementioned diversity criteria, but also constantly monitoring and 
reporting on the diversity within major organizations (Carter el al., 2003). In this regard, 
education is used because of its crucial role in influencing firm performance when it comes 
to hiring a board for a specific industry (Argenti, 1976; Murray, 1989). Simons and Pelled 
(1999) found that educational and cognitive level diversity within the board of directors 
led to a positive impact on the firm’s performance, thus hypothesizing that diversity in the 
board has a positive effect on organizational financial performance through the potential 
increase in the firm’s performance and improved decision-making. In addition, Erhardt et 
al. (2003) found that having diversified board leads to an increase in the firm’s financial 
performance as well. Therefore, proving the existence of a relationship between board 
diversity, as represented by the three aspects described above, and firm financial 
performance indicates the usefulness of investigating this topic in the context of the UK.  
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2.5.3 Board Tenure Diversity 
The tenure of decision-makers (represented by the board of directors) has received 
significant attention in literature as far as strategic change is concerned (Tarus, & Aime, 
2014). This literature review also found previous studies that linked board tenure to the 
strategic change and future continuity of companies, but not with financial performance, 
except for Huang and Hillary (2018). Most of these studies have only focused on the CEO 
or the top management as a whole and its impact on a company’s managerial and strategic 
change (Tihanyi et al., 2000; Herrmann and Datta, 2005). Huang & Hillary (2018) studied 
the relationship between board tenure and accounting performance. Their study used cross-
sectional methodology to explore S&P 1500 firms in the US for the period from 1998 to 
2010. The study found an optimum average number of years (9 years in particular) for the 
tenure of boardroom members in order to realize tenure benefits with respect to profits.  
Another study conducted by Bantel and Jackson (1989) who have highlighted the 
importance of having long tenure that results in a better group thinking, aversion to risk 
and adherence to status. Kagzi and Guha (2018) have also mentioned that long board tenure 
develops a common language that in return facilitates the smooth transmission of work-
related communication. The latter makes a long-term organizational tenure more efficient.  
Nevertheless, no other scholarly studies approached the same context to the best of 
our knowledge. As a result, studying board tenure and its relationship with firm 
performance will also contribute to the literature in this respect.  
In a nutshell, and after reviewing the literature on board diversity across different 
contexts, including the UK, it came to our notice that there is a lack of studies into the three 
dimensions of diversity (gender, tenure, and background and skills) and this is are common 
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across different countries including the UK, Australia, and Turkey.  There is no wide 
consensus on the benefits of board diversity; the majority of the literature addresses 
diversity and its effect of several factors with no guarantee that board diversity will lead to 
positive consequences. Even so, this review has highlighted some of the benefits of board 
diversity, based on previous literature. However, it is still debatable whether the boardroom 
should be diversified in the first place. This is why this present study is not only addressing 
the effect of board diversity on firm performance but also whether boardroom diversity is 
influential in the first place and whether its effect is positive of negative, as will be 
discussed in the coming chapters. Table 2.1 presents a summary of the key studies that 
have been used to direct and shape the current research.  
2.6 Developing Countries 
This part of the study will be considering the three attributes of board diversity in 
the context of the developing countries that include; Turkey, Malaysia, Lebanon, Egypt, 
Indonesia and India. However, due to the limited number of studies, this section will be 
categorized based country wise with the different studies approached the same context. 
To start with, there has been different studies conducted in the context of Turkey 
that shed lights on the importance of board diversity from more than one attribute. For 
example, Kiliç and Kuzey (2016) studied gender diversity at the boardroom level by using 
instrumental variable regression analysis, and their results showed a significant positive 
relationship between the occupancy of female board members as a percentage of the total 
members of the board and firm performance as measured by ROA, return on equity, and 
return on sales. Similarly Ararat et al (2015) found a positive relationship between board 
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diversity as one indicator that includes board gender diversity with the firm’s performance 
on BIST-100 index in 2006. 
On the contrary, Solakoglu et al (2016) who studied listed firms in BIST100 index 
of bursa Istanbul from 2002 to 2006, found the opposite where there has been a weak 
evidence that gender diversity impacts the performance of the firms. His study used one 
market-based performance indicator and two accounting-based indicators.  
In the context of Egypt, there has been two studies approaching board diversity 
from one perspective which is the board gender diversity. Ararat et al (2015) has 
approached the context of top 50 most active companies listed in the Egyptian exchange 
from the year of 2005 to 2014. His results found that there has been positive relationship 
between the board gender diversity in the boardroom with firm’s performance. He has used 
multiple proxies for measuring the performance of the firms that include; return on assets, 
return on invested capital, return on equity and finally market to book value. Although his 
study is considered now as outdated since its context was only approaching data until 2014, 
however, it is still a base to conclude on the trend of gender diversification on the financial 
performance of Egyptian listed companies. Another study conducted by Abdelzaher and 
Abdelzaher (2019) approaching the same context of Egypt on a sample basis of 114 
Egyptian listed firms in the year of 2014 and revealed a positive association between board 
gender diversity on firm’s performance measured by return on equity and Tobin’s Q.  
Abdelzaher’s study is no exception of considering his study as outdated since it 
considered the context in the time period of 2014 only. In addition, it only considers one 
attribute of board diversity which is represented by gender boardroom diversity.  
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Focusing on the Asian continent and in particular Indonesia as a developing 
country, there has been multiple studies discussing gender boardroom diversification and 
its impact of the performance of the firms.  Triana and Asri (2017) approached the context 
of public listed companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) from 2011 until 2015 
using multiple regression models and revealed the positive association between gender 
diversity and firm’s performance. Although the study covered a more recent context 
compared to the Egyptian context, however, it only considered two control variables 
represented by leverage, and firm’s size. The latter lack might cause a lower adjusted R-
square variable which may lead to the inability to concluded on the multiple regression 
model that the authors have adopted.  
Contradicting to the previous study conducted by Triana and Asri (2017), Darmadi 
(2013) who studied 92.4 percent of the public firms listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (IDX) found a negative association between the boardroom gender 
diversification and firm’s performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. The differences 
in the results might be attributed to the difference of the time period studied, as Darmadi 
has only considered the year of 2007, while Triana and Asri considered a more recent 
period of 2011 to 2015.  
In the Lebanese context, there has been one study conducted by Jamali et al (2007) 
who approached the banking sector that comprises of 12 different banks. His study was 
mainly focusing on having board gender diversity and its relationship with the 
effectiveness of the board. His study revealed that the presence of female in the boardroom 
enhances board’s performance which may indirectly be affecting positively the 
performance of these banks. Jamali study was inconclusive since it covered more than one 
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attribute of the board that includes gender diversity percentage, female qualifications and 
number of years of experience in a particular field. The study’s control variables were 
mainly attributed to female boardroom members’ characteristics’ rather than considering 
other board diversity attributes. This is because his study is solely considering gender 
diversification and ignoring other attributes of boardroom diversification. 
Malaysia on the other side has studied gender diversity across different periods. To 
start with, Jubliee et al (2018) who studied gender diversity in the banking sector from the 
year of 2007 to 2016 found the presence of positive association between gender diversity 
and firm’s performance. His study approached ten banking institution listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. His theoretical design was panel data analysis where he has also used Tobin’s Q 
as performance proxy.  
Another study on the Malaysian context studying the background attribute of board 
diversity from the year of 2010 to 2014 on the 350 non-financial listed companies in 
Malaysian Stock Exchange found a positive association between the latter and the firm’s 
performance. The author relied on two different proxies for measuring performance that 
include ROE and ROA. Although this study considered a wide range of time period, 
however, it lacks a market-based indicator for measuring the performance of the firm as it 
only considers the accounting aspect of it.  
At this stage of the study, it can be concluded that there is a huge gap either in the 
developed or developing countries that approached the three main attributes of boardroom 
diversity that is being studied in this study. In addition, the literature is into some extent 
considered as outdated since the latest study was conducted in 2019 but approached the 
context of Egypt up until 2014 only. Even though there are studies that approached contexts 
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until 2016, however, it still lacks the integration of board diversity attributes with firm’s 
performance, as it only considers one factor of the latter.  
To the best knowledge of the author, there are no studies conducted that approached 
the executive member gender diversity before, and therefore it is considered as one of the 
main contributions in this study.   
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Table 2.1 
 
Key Studies Covering the Effects of Board Diversity on Firm Performance 
 
 
 
Authors and year 
Study 
context 
Objective or scope Methodology Results 
Siciliano (1996) 
YMCA 
organizations 
The relationship of board member 
diversity to organizational performance 
Panel data analysis 
Gender diversity is positively linked with a firm's level of social 
performance but negatively linked with the level of funds raised 
Carter et al. (2003) 
Fortune 1000 
Companies 
Relationship between board diversity and 
the company's value 
Cross-sectional 
methodology 
A positive linkage between a company's value and female representation 
on the board 
Smith, et al. (2006) 
2500 Danish 
firms 
Do women in top management affect firm 
performance? 
Panel data analysis 
The results show that the proportion of women in top management jobs 
tends to have positive effects on firm performance, even after controlling 
for numerous characteristics of the firm and the direction of causality. 
The results show that the positive effects of women in top management 
strongly depend on the qualifications of female top managers 
Brammer et al. 
(2007) 
543 UK 
Publicly Listed 
Companies 
The ethnic and gender diversity of the 
corporate board of UK companies, 
placing particular emphasis on links to 
board size and industry characteristics 
Cross-sectional time 
series methodology 
Female representation was significant in the types of company that deal 
directly with the customers in the lower level of management 
Rose (2007) Germany 
Female representation and firm 
performance 
Cross-sectional time 
series methodology 
No relationship 
Martin et al. (2008) 
450,000 UK 
companies 
The first overview of the incidence of 
female directors in UK companies, and 
exploring the trend of hiring female 
directors in the boardroom and its 
percentage of occupying vacancies 
Cross-sectional time 
series methodology 
Reported disaggregated data and information. Board gender diversity 
will be achieved by 2225 at the earliest if the increase in the number of 
female directors keeps growing at the same rate. In addition, male 
directors are still dominating boardrooms, except for small and service 
companies, where female directors are present 
Hafsi and Turgut 
(2013) 
S&P 500 firms 
The presence of effect of board diversity 
on corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
Cross-sectional time 
series methodology 
Significant effect of board diversity on CSR 
Buse et al. (2016) 1456 boards 
The influence of board diversity, board 
diversity policies and practices, and board 
inclusion behaviors on nonprofit 
governance practices 
Panel data analysis 
The presence of women in the boardroom directly affects the policies 
and practices of the board, which consequently affects the board's 
performance 
Low et al. (2015) 
Hong Kong, 
South Korea, 
Malaysia and 
Singapore 
Board gender diversity and firm 
performance 
Cross-sectional time 
series methodology 
Increasing the number of female directors on the board has a positive 
effect on firm performance, as measured by return on equity 
Protasovs (2015) Southeast Asia 
Examining the relationship between 
demographic and cognitive diversity 
factors within the board of directors and 
firm financial performance. 
Panel data analysis 
The study failed to find a significant relationship between the studied 
variables 
Vob (2015) Norway 
The impact of gender-diverse boards on 
firm financial performance in Norway 
Cross-sectional time 
series methodology 
The analysis reveals no significant evidence that firm financial 
performance is positively impacted by gender-diverse boards of 
directors. For Tobin’s Q, there is a negative relationship between the 
gender diversity of boards of directors and firm financial performance 
Kiliç and Kuzey 
(2016) 
Turkey 
Relationship between board gender 
diversity and A company's performance 
Instrumental 
variable regression 
analysis 
Significant positive relationship between occupancy of female board 
members and firm performance 
Rao and Tilt (2016) Australia 
Examining the relationship between 
board diversity and CSR reporting 
Longitudinal 
analysis 
Gender, tenure, and multiple directorship have significant potential to 
influence CSR 
Gordini and Rancati 
(2017) 
Norway and 
Italy 
Relationship between board gender 
diversity and firm financial performance 
in Italy, where the recently enforced Law 
120/2011 prescribes gender quotas for 
boards of directors. 
Panel data analysis 
Gender diversity, as measured by the percentage of women on a board 
and by the Blau and the Shannon indices, has a positive and significant 
effect on Tobin’s Q, whereas the presence of one or more women on the 
board per se has an insignificant effect on a firm’s financial performance. 
Huang et al. (2018) Vietnam 
Testing the relationship between board 
diversity and earning quality 
Panel data analysis 
Significant relationship between board diversity and its impact on 
earnings quality 
Ooi et al. (2017) 
Publicly listed 
tourism firms in 
four Asian 
markets 
Board diversity and its relationship in 
human capital and social capital in crisis 
periods and the effect on financial 
performance 
Cross-sectional time 
series methodology 
No significant improvement in the firm's performance; however, it 
mitigates the negative impact of a crisis affecting the firm's performance 
Li et al (2018) 
1000 publicly 
listed US firms 
The relationship between demographic 
diversity on boards and employer–
employee relationships (EERs) 
Hierarchical 
regression analyses 
Ethnic diversity and gender diversity have positive effects on EER. 
Contextual factors such as a firm's financial situation should moderate 
the relationship between demographic diversity on boards and EERs 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A theoretical framework helps to explain, predict, and understand a particular 
phenomenon and, in some circumstances, challenge existing knowledge within the limits 
of critical bounding assumptions. The board diversity topic has been approached in the 
literature via different theoretical frameworks that include gender role theory, agency 
theory, and resource dependency theory. In this part of the study, all three theories will be 
approached and we will identify why resource dependency was chosen over the others.  
3.1 Gender Role Theory 
Gender role theory has been considered to be one of the oldest theories used to 
define the relationship between board diversity and firm performance. For example, Eagly 
(1987) proposed the gender role theory, which identified that the gender of an individual 
is enough to determine one’s behavior, and its effectiveness with respect to influence. This 
theory assumes that the behavior of males and females can be assessed in terms of 
divergence from expectations of the appropriate gender-expected behavior. In other words, 
there can be variance between the behavior expected of a particular gender and real 
behavior. A more recent study was also conducted by Eagly et al. (1995) mentioned that 
individuals who use day-to-day tactics that are aligned with the accepted gender behavior 
are perceived to have higher value by others. These tactics include communication with 
suppliers, customers, investors, and other board members. As humans, we expect women 
to express more feminine traits such as sympathy and gentleness (Eagly, 1987). On the 
other hand, men are supposed to be more assertive and aggressive. Women are believed to 
manage difficult situations more wisely than men because of their flexibility (Rosener, 
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1995). Since boards of directors need to use communication techniques that can influence 
other parties, having the gender diversity in the boardroom (with both males and females) 
would lead to better communication and the influence of the different tactics of both 
genders would help the company to survive (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Forbes and 
Milliken (1999) identify the importance and reasons for gender role methodology being 
adopted by the literature; however, these studies considered the gender aspect and ignored 
the other aspects of diversity that could be considered. This highlights the main weakness 
that can result from ignoring this theory when conducting research, as a study may not be 
able to incorporate all the possible dependent variables.  
Furthermore, earlier studies that addressed board diversity in general and board 
gender diversity in particular were descriptive and did not develop any theoretical 
framework (Terjesen et al., 2009). This has engendered a gap in which there are a lack of 
theories or frameworks that is suitable for this present study.  
3.2 Agency Theory 
The ultimate role of the boardroom members in the agency framework is strictly 
connected with resolving the agency problems between the two parties: the managers 
(agents) and the shareholders (owners) by controlling the remuneration and whether the 
current agents create value added for the owners (Carter et al., 2003). The agency theory, 
by definition, is highly correlated to the firm’s financial performance. This relates to the 
board’s role in monitoring the potential costs that are associated with the management 
pursuing their own interests at the cost of the shareholders’ interests (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003). The monitoring role’s importance lies in the fact that the boardroom members are 
able to reduce the agency costs that are connected with the separation of ownership and 
  
   
29 
 
control (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), hence leading to a significant increase in the firm’s 
financial performance because of the expenses of the agency costs being avoided. The 
agency costs avoided were thoroughly explained by Berle & Means (1932) in their 
description of the principle of segregating ownership and control. Hence, providing the 
managers with good opportunities to pursue their own interests comes at the cost of revenue 
and profit maximization for the entity. On the basis of the results of Hillman & Dalziel 
(2003) and Berle & Means (1932), it is hypothesized that the boardroom is able to monitor 
the costs of the company, including the agency costs. This may lead to a significant increase 
in the firm’s financial performance. In addition, Erhardt et al., (2003) and Simons & Pelled 
(1999) found that boardroom diversity leads to an improved decision-making process and 
overall organizational performance. In other words, a board that is able to make better 
decisions and operate at a high supervisory level is assumed to monitor and control the 
state of the company better. This agrees with the stated hypothesis that boardroom diversity 
leads to an increase in firm financial performance. 
To date, agency theory studies have not incorporated board gender diversity, board 
background and skills, and board tenure in one theory. It has been used earlier to determine 
the effect of demographic diversity of the boardroom members on a firm’s performance as 
per Protasovs (2015). However, demographic diversity fails to address board tenure 
diversity, which is one of the main components of this study.  
If we consider similar studies, the majority either adopted gender role theory or 
used agency theory like Protasovs (2015), or they used resource dependency theory, which 
is used in this study. Adopting a theoretical framework is important for defining the 
methodology used to approach the dependent variables and their relationships with the 
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independent ones. As a result, this study adopted the resource dependency theory proposed 
by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), though it was not developed for this purpose. Resource 
dependency theory has, in the past, provided useful perspectives when studying the 
relationship between board diversity and firm financial performance (Vob, 2015), which 
led to the adoption of this theory. The following section of this study explains the main 
reasons for adopting this framework in detail, along with its definition.   
3.3 Resource Dependence Theory  
The general rule is as follows: firms around the world operate within an open 
system where they need each other to exchange and/or acquire other resources to survive. 
This creates a dependency between firms and third parties (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; de 
Cabo, Gimeno, & Nieto, 2012), where both parties are better off in the end. There are four 
primary benefits of having external linkages as a provision of resources identified by 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). These are: (1) information and expertise, (2) creation of 
channels of communication with important constituents of the firm, (3) providing 
commitments for support from important organizations or groups, and (4) the creation of 
legitimacy for the firm in the external environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
The theory that is used in this study proposes that directors (board members) link 
their own organizations with other external firms to address certain environmental 
dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Hillman & Cannella, 2007). Linking this theory 
to the context of this study, board diversity opens up different ways and channels of 
communication, networks and links among corporations (Hillman, Cannella, &Paetzold, 
2000; Liu, Wei, & Xie, 2013). This increases the probability of access to different sources 
of finance (Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes, & Laffarga, 2015) and improves linkages and 
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relationships with customers and competitors (Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2015). Some 
companies appoint female directors as board members in order to maintain good 
interactions and relationships with their existing and potential clients or customers (Liu et 
al., 2013). Thus connections to the external resources that could be provided by having 
female board members might have the potential to increase critical resourcing, which 
consequently enhances firm performance (Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2015).  
Similarly, having board members with different backgrounds and tenure periods 
will also open up opportunities for additional sources of funds, better communications 
skills and better external opportunities overall, which contributes to the continuity of the 
company. Again relying on the possibility of having more access to different resources, 
including diverse board members in terms of their gender, and skills and background 
improves a firm’s legitimacy by signaling that the company promotes the cause of gender 
equality (Isidro & Sobral, 2014). By having female directors on the board, positive signals 
are sent to different stakeholder groups, including customers, investors, suppliers, 
communities, and, more importantly, pressure groups. Consequently, the firm’s image and 
reputation in the market will be improved. (Huse & Solberg, 2006; Lückerath-Rovers, 
2013).   
This theory has been adopted by different scholars when studying the relationship 
between the board diversity and firm performance (e.g. Vob, 2015). This is because 
resource dependence theory explores how organizational behavior is affected by external 
resources. Since firms are dealing with external parties like customers, investors, suppliers, 
and the community, they are affected by them. As the board of directors drives the entity’s 
wheels, the board should be able to deal adequately with those external parties to achieve 
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success. From this perspective, the resource dependence theory has been used extensively 
in previous studies in this area, because it studies the relationship between board diversity 
and how this affects the relationship with external parties, which could be translated into 
financial performance in terms of net income, net income ratios, and increased company 
wealth and value (Martin et al., 2008). In the next section, the study will focus on the 
theoretical framework and its development.  
3.4 Theoretical Framework  
The theoretical framework that has been formulated in this study is composed of 
three parts (Fig. 3.1). The right-hand side of Fig. 3.1 shows the control variables with 
arrows pointing towards the firm performance measurements. The arrows indicate the 
direction of the influence. Similarly, the left-hand side shows the board diversity factors, 
which are the main independent variables in this study. The arrow is pointing towards firm 
performance, as the scope of the study is to investigate the independent variables’ influence 
over a company’s performance. 
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Figure 3.1. Relationship between Dependent and Independent Variables. 
3.5 Development of Hypotheses  
As has been discussed earlier, resource dependence theory was chosen to illustrate 
the relationship between board diversity and firm performance. Looking at one aspect of 
diversity, different studies have revealed that bringing female directors into the boardroom 
will further diversify a firm’s networks (Ibarra, 1992, 1993). Although the presence of 
women in the board of directors is seldom found, there is evidence that women’s 
understanding is usually better than men’s in some industries (Ibarra, 1992, 1993). 
Consequently, this leads to increased firm performance, earnings, and success (Arfken, 
Bellar, & Helms, 2004).  
Similarly, women are considered to be more conservative and more risk-averse than 
men in personal financial decision-making (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Watson & 
Mcnaughton, 2007). This aspect, along with careful thinking in the boardroom, would lead 
to a more stable financial performance. As an example, Palvia, Vähämaa, and Vähämaa 
(2015) found that banks with female directors in the boardroom were less likely to fail, 
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especially during periods of financial crisis, compared with banks that were run by male 
directors only. This main reason behind their conclusion was that they found banks with 
female directors had more equity capital and lower default risk, which qualifies these banks 
as safer and less risky than those with higher risks of the inability of debtors to repay their 
financial obligations. As far as executive members gender diversity is concerned, it has not 
been studied in the prior literature which in fact demonstrate the importance of this study 
in contributing to deliver a new variable that is not yet studied. The rational of executive 
members gender diversity is still into some extent similar to the rationale of board gender 
diversification as a whole where the presence of female diversification within the 
boundaries of executive members is also influencing the performance of the board. 
Therefore, it can be hypothesized that  
H1: Board gender diversity has a positive association with firm financial 
performance 
H2: Executive members gender diversity has a positive association with firm 
financial performance 
It was discovered by Hillman, Cannella, and Harris (2002) and Singh, Terjesen, 
and Vinnicombe (2008) that female board members are more likely to have non-business 
backgrounds, which provide the firm with a portfolio of different experiences that can 
enhance the firm’s overall innovation and creativity with respect to problem-solving. 
Considering the latter results, diversity from the dimension of background and skills will 
also add additional value to the board as a whole, especially in terms of having a variety of 
backgrounds to deal with external parties professionally. In general, the knowledge and 
skills of the boardroom members strongly influences the effectiveness of their executive 
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roles of monitoring and resource provision (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Members of the 
board of directors usually bring unique human capital to the company. This is because they 
have different levels of education and experiences, which in turn, diversifies the boardroom 
(Kesner, 1988). As a result, the process of decision-making and the decisions made by the 
board members will be enhanced because of the distinctive new perspectives and 
knowledge (Fagan and Gonzáles Menéndez, 2012). In conclusion, background and skills 
diversity will certainly create great advantages for the company and ultimately its 
profitability and performance. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that: 
H3: Background and skills diversity in the board has a positive association with 
firm financial performance. 
As far as board tenure is concerned, which has been widely neglected in the 
majority of previous studies, it is hypothesized that the longer the board tenure is, the more 
the board members understand the business and the company’s specific operations, which 
results in a more consistent way of monitoring and managing the business.  A longer tenure 
as a board member is sufficient to enable managers to improve a company’s earnings and 
profits (Huang & Hilary, 2018; Li et al., 2017). Although a contradictory point of view 
states that increased familiarity between the board and management can compromise the 
board’s independence, it is important to the note that the scope of the study does not 
incorporate independence and its relationship with a company’s performance. Therefore, 
we hypothesized a positive relationship between board tenure diversity and overall firm 
performance. 
H4: Board tenure diversity has a positive association with firm financial 
performance. 
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In conclusion, this study has developed four main hypotheses in order to test the 
influence impact of board diversity on firm performance. In the following chapter, the 
study will discuss the approach used in collecting the data, the sample chosen, and the 
measurement of the dependent, independent, and control variables.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses multiple key points. First, it addresses the methodology that 
has been adopted, then it describes the research design (i.e. method, aim, boundary, setting, 
timing, outcome, or goal). Finally, the chapter describes how the sample was chosen and 
the basis for this.  
Research methodology is a term that describes the methods the study will use in 
attempts to answer a specific research question. As per Creswell (1996, p. 41), the 
strategies of inquiry are of different kinds: “types of qualitative, quantitative, and mixed 
methods design that provide a specific direction, for a research, for procedures in a research 
design”. As far as this study is concerned, the research design and method of inquiry will 
be carried out on a time spectrum, where a cross-sectional research design will be used. 
The inquiry methodology will be on a quantitative basis, in which the study will deal with 
numbers and figures that are measured in a systematic way of investigating phenomena 
and their relationships (Leedy, 1993).  
4.2 Research Design 
Cross-sectional research designs have been used because of their functionality 
when they are used for dealing with information about different individuals or groups at 
the same point in time or during the same period of time (Levin, 2006). This definition 
exactly matches with the approach used in this study, where each company represents an 
“individual”, and the time frame is from 2013 to 2016 for all companies.  
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There are many advantages and limitations associated with a cross-sectional design. 
To start with the advantages, cross-sectional designs are known for their ease of use 
compared with other designs, as they takes up little time to conduct a survey the selected 
sample (Levin, 2006). This applies to this present study, since it relies on secondary data 
only. Similarly, a cross-sectional design helps in estimating the prevalence of an outcome 
of interest, since the sample is usually taken from the whole population (i.e. not a particular 
segment or sector). Additionally, it provides future research directions based on its 
outcomes (Levin, 2006). On the other hand, a cross-sectional design faces an obstacle when 
it comes to inferring causality, where it is difficult to assess the actual influence of one 
independent variable on one particular dependent variable, which could be obscured by the 
presence of another factor that relates to both measures. Furthermore, this research design 
only captures the data at one certain point in time, which, in this research, is the year-end. 
Thus it will be difficult to assess a firm’s characteristics or its performance over the entire 
year from one single point of time.  
Following the selection of cross-sectional design and the data collection process, 
the analysis should provide evidence to either accept or reject the study hypotheses. 
Researchers using this methodology usually start by identifying one or more variables that 
are intended to be tested in their research work and proceed with data collection 
accordingly. This is followed by statistical analysis that can include but are not limited to 
descriptive statistics, linear regression analysis, and multi-collinearity. 
This study has been conducted in the context of the UK using the companies in the 
FTSE 350 for the period from 2013 to 2016. The model that has been developed for this 
study is composed of one dependent variable (firm performance as measured by ROA and 
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Tobin’s Q) and multiple independent variables (female board representation (in %), board 
tenure, and board background and skills diversity (in %)).  
4.3 Research Context  
The context of the UK was chosen because of a lack of previous studies, not only 
those focusing on board diversity compared with other developed countries, but also a lack 
of studies pertaining to general corporate governance practices. Although the researcher 
found only a few studies investigating a similar topic by Martin et al., (2008) and Scott and 
Roper (2016),  these studies did not study the exact same relationships of firm performance 
as measured by two different proxies (ROA and Tobin’s Q) or did not even cover enough 
to draw conclusions on this topic compared with other studies conducted in North America, 
Central Europe, and Australia.  
This lack acted as a motive for conducting this study, as the UK has been always a 
leading country for developing corporate governance codes addressing board 
diversification. In fact, UK boards over the years have been working to achieve what 
corporate governance experts would regard as best practices, as stipulated by the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2012). First of all, in relation 
to gender diversity and the inclusion of women in the board of directors, the UK Corporate 
Governance Code stipulates that the boardroom should be gender-diversified to include 
women in their composition (Financial Reporting Council, 2012). The other key aspect of 
board diversity is in relation to non-executive directors.  The U.K Corporate Governance 
Code stipulates that except for smaller companies, each board is expected to ensure that at 
least more than half of the board are non-executive directors (NEDs), excluding the 
chairperson. This is the only way to guarantee that the executive does not have full power 
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when it comes to the decision-making process in the organization (Mishra & Jhunjhunwala, 
2013).  
To further ensure better board diversity, it is imperative for the board to ensure a 
certain degree of balance in terms of skills and experience among the board members, and 
also diversity in their independence and knowledge of the company (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2012). This would go a long way towards ensuring that the different board 
members can effectively achieve their many duties in the organization (Foster, 2008).  The 
main effect of this is that in the long run, the focus will primarily be on the management in 
the organization, and little regard will be given to the other board members who are not 
part of the management in the organization and who will have minimal say in the running 
of the firm (Joecks, Pull, & Vetter, 2013). It would also be important to ensure that 
achieving diversity of perspective is a key objective in the appointment of board members.  
In their study, Joecks et al. (2013) argue that diversity in perspective will go a long way in 
improving the overall level of effectiveness of the company in the achievement of its 
objectives. Similarly, firms must ensure that they remain open to helping the personnel 
understand the steps that they are taking in ensuring diversity within the board and openly 
discuss any challenges or issues that they may be facing in the achievement of this 
objective.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the UK has been always keen on diversifying 
the boardroom to ensure a balanced board of directors, which helps in achieving firms’ 
aims and objectives and, at the same time, acting independently to comply with the trust 
delegated by its shareholders.  
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From another perspective, as per Smith (2018) in the World Economics Forum, the 
UK is one of the leading countries in the world and the London Stock Exchange is one of 
the most attractive and efficient stock markets. Therefore, investors, creditors, and 
stakeholders in general are interested to understand further how the performance of 
companies in the UK are affected by different factors, apart from well-known ones, such 
as business nature, managers’ attitudes, and economic factors. Countries which are 
geographically located near each other usually share similar characteristics; for example, 
the European countries share similar characteristics with the UK that include: business 
nature, firm structure, firm composition, and corporate governance codes and regulations, 
and entities in these countries are likely to find the outcomes of a study in the UK context 
to be relevant.  As a result, this study contributes to the literature by developing a better 
understanding of the effect of board gender diversity on firms’ financial performance in 
the UK and this can be further extended to other countries in Europe and other developed 
countries that have similar characteristics. Furthermore, since this study addresses board 
diversity and its implications for performance, and since companies’ performance is tied 
up with the economic situation of every country, this study will be of interest to different 
parties in the UK and Europe.   
FTSE 350 companies were  chose as the study population as these are the major 
350 companies among different industries and segments listed on the the London Stock 
Exchange; therefore, the study’s conclusions could be useful when interpreting the results 
across the different business segments in the UK.   
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4.4 Sample 
The time interval of the study is the period from 2013 to 2016 from which 
represents a consecutive period of four years. Our sample comprises FTSE 350 companies, 
giving a set of 1304 individual results. All companies were included, whether they were 
financial or non-financial. However, 96 companies were excluded because of a lack of 
available data. The main reason for incorporating different types of companies is that the 
board diversity dimensions studied in this study are applicable to all types of companies 
and their operations.  
The FTSE 350 companies are segmented into a total of 11 categories based on the 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) code as follows. 
Table 4.1 
 
FTSE 350 Companies in the Study Population by Industry Sector  
 
 
No. Category Number of entities 
1 Financial 72 
2 Materials 30 
3 Healthcare 17 
4 Consumer Discretionary 50 
5 Utilities 13 
6 Energy 15 
7 Consumer Staples 19 
8 Industrials 47 
9 Communication Services 19 
10 Real estate 25 
11 Information Technology 19 
 Total 326 
 
4.5 Data Collection 
Data for all dependent, independent, and control variables were primarily collected 
from Thomson Reuters. Moreover, the researcher also sought for other sources for 
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collecting data, such as governmental resources (reports about governance and quotas, 
percentage of women on boards, etc.) that measured the percentage of women on boards 
of directors, or that provided data about board structure and detailed information about 
board tenure. Not all datasets were found in Thomson Reuters, although the majority was 
available, but older data from 2013 were difficult to extract. This is why the researcher 
used the annual reports of the companies in the study to extract the corporate governance 
data accordingly. The author only managed to manually obtain variables that are not used 
or involved in any computation used in other variables.   
Data analysis was conducted by using IBM SPSS-25 software. Phase I of the 
analysis involved simple statistical analysis including the descriptive statistics and 
Pearson’s correlations. This was followed by Phase II, which undertook a linear regression 
analysis, using the same software. 
4.6 The Study Model 
The multi-regression analysis model shown below (Eqn. 1) identifies the 
relationships and the coefficients of each variable affecting firm’s performance as follows: 
PERF=β0+β1 FBM+ β2 EMGD+β3 BSD+β4 BT+β5 BOD+β6 MTGS+β7 NED+β8 
DCC+β9 NC+β10 GC+ β11 FSIZE+β12 LEV+β13 YER (Eqn. 1) 
Where:  
β0 is the intercept; β1, β2, and β are the regression model coefficients for the board 
diversity variables; and βn are the coefficients for the control variables.  Table 4.2 outlines 
the different variables in the model, along with their definitions and symbols. 
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Table 4.2 
 
Variables Used in the Regression Model 
 
 
Variables Symbols Measurements 
Nature of 
Variables 
Source 
Firm Financial 
performance 
PERF 
ROA = net income / total assets 
Tobin’s Q = market value + debt / 
total assets + debt 
Dependent 
variable 
Terjesen et al, 
2016 
Lenard, Yu, York, 
& Wu, 2014 
Percentage of female 
directors 
FBM 
% of the total number of BOD 
members 
Independent 
variable 
 
Background and 
skills diversity (%) 
BSD 
% of the board by diversity in 
backgrounds and skills 
Independent 
variable 
Protasovs, 2015; 
Murray 1989; 
Argenti 1976 
Average board 
Tenure 
BT 
Average number of years each board 
member has been on the board. 
Independent 
variable 
Tihanyi et al., 
2000; Herrmann 
and Datta, 2005 
Huang & Hilary, 
2018 
Board size BOD Number of board members 
Control 
variable 
Carter et al., 2003 
Number of meetings MTGS Number of annual board meetings 
Control 
variable 
Florackis and 
Ozkan, 2009 
Non-executive 
directors 
NED 
% of non-executive directors / board 
size 
Control 
variable 
Nguyen & Phan 
2016 
Duality of CEO and 
chairperson 
DCC 
Dummy variable, taking 1 when a 
committee is present and 0 otherwise  
Control 
variable 
Di Pietra, 
Grambovas, 
Raonic, & 
Riccaboni, 2008 
Presence of a 
nomination 
committee 
NC 
Dummy variable, taking 1 when a 
committee is present and 0 otherwise 
Control 
variable 
Ruigrok, Peck, 
Tacheva, Greve, & 
Hu, 2006 
Presence of corporate 
governance 
committee 
CG 
Dummy variable, taking 1 when a 
committee is present and 0 otherwise 
Control 
variable 
Nguyen & Phan, 
2016 
Executive members’ 
gender diversity 
EMGD 
% of gender diversity among 
executive members 
Control 
variable 
This study 
Firm size FSIZE Log (total assets) 
Control 
variable 
Terjesen et al, 
2016 
Leverage LEV Total debt / total equity 
Control 
variable 
Vintilā & Nenu, 
2015 
Year YER Dummy variable 
Control 
variable 
Shehata et al., 
2017 
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4.7 Measurements  
In this section, presents the different variables that are used in this study, starting 
with the dependent variables, which are ROA and Tobin’s Q. The main four independent 
variables are: board tenure, gender diversity, executive members gender diversity, and 
background and skills diversity. Finally, the control variables that have been used in the 
model, which are held constant during our analysis so that we can better test the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables clearly, are board size, number of board 
meetings, percentage of non-executive directors, CEO duality, presence of a nomination 
committee, presence of a corporate governance committee, executive members’ gender 
diversity, firm size, leverage, year, and industry type. 
4.7.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable considered in this study is the firms’ performance, which t 
measured by two proxies: Tobin’s Q (which is the market valuation indicator) and ROA, 
which is an accounting indicator. The data for these two variables was collected through 
the Thomson Reuters database as previously mentioned. This database is a well-known 
source of corporate governance data that has been extensively used in the literature 
database because of its credibility and reliability (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Amman, 
Oesch, & Schmid, 2011; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Barnhart & Rosenstein, 1988; Carter et 
al., 2003; Combs et al., 2005; Florackis, Kostakis, & Ozkan, 2009; Ikaheimo, Kjellman, 
Holmberg, & Sari Jussila, 2004; Lefort &Urzúa, 2008; Maury, 2006; Kim & Lim, 2010 
and others).  
The first dependent variable, Tobin’s Q, has been calculated as:  
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Tobin's Q = (total market value of equity + total liabilities)/(total equity + total 
liabilities) (Eqn 2) 
This formula provides a clear indication of a firms expected performance as 
mentioned by Terjesen et al. (2016). If the outcome of the formula – the Tobin’s Q value 
– is greater than one, this means that shareholders strongly believe that the firm is worth 
more than its current book value. On the other hand, if the Tobin’s Q value is lower than 
one, this means that the market is expecting the company to decrease or that the shares will 
losevalue in the near future (Terjesen et al., 2016). Tobin’s Q ratio has been used in a wide 
range of studies in the literature to examine financial performance. It has also been 
extensively used in the literature to assess future investment opportunities (Tobin & 
Brainard, 1968, 1977; Tobin 1969, 1978). This is why the researcher will use Tobin’s Q as 
one of the performance indicators for the sample of FTSE 350 companies.  
The author will also use ROA for more inclusive analysis in determining the impact 
of board diversity on the financial performance of FTSE 350 firms. ROA, as a ratio, is 
computed as the net income divided by the value the firm’s total assets. The ROA results 
should provide us with an indication of how well the company is able to manage and use 
its resources in generating income. Previous studies such as Lenard, Yu, York, and Wu 
(2014), and Adler (2001) have used ROA to measure firm’s performance. 
4.7.2 Independent Variables 
There are four independent variables in this study. The first is the percentage of 
female directors that are represented in the boardroom of the FTSE 350 companies. The 
second independent variable is the executive member gender diversity, which is 
represented by the percentage of female members’ representation among executive 
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members only. The third independent variable is the board’s background and skills 
diversity, which will be measured as the percentage of board members who have either an 
industry-specific background or a strong financial background. Finally, the last variable 
will be board tenure diversity; this variable is measured by calculating the average number 
of years each board member has been on the board. 
To shed lights on the executive members’ gender diversity variable, to the best 
knowledge of the author, has not been studied before in any context related to board 
diversity or performance. However, we are incorporating it here, since we hypothesized 
that the higher the board diversity the higher the performance. Since executive members 
are a part of the boardroom; therefore, this variable has a direct relationship with board 
diversity and performance.  
4.7.3 Control Variables 
The importance of control variables for identifying the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables by isolating the effect of the controlled proxies is why 
they are used in the majority of regression analyses. This is why previous studies used a 
selection of control variables to examine the effect of the main variable (i.e. board 
diversity) on the firm performance. This study is not an exception, as it considers the effect 
of corporate governance factors on firm’s performance. The control variables in this study 
come at two levels to include controls for the board itself and a second level for the firm 
as a whole. The board-level control variables are: board size, number of board meetings, 
percentage of NEDs, CEO duality, the presence of nomination and corporate governance 
committees, and executive members’ gender diversity. On the other hand, firm-level 
control variables include firm size, level of leverage, and year. It worth noting that the 
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presence of audit committee has been ignored since this study is approaching the context 
of the UK, and based on the UK corporate governance code, it is mandatory for listed 
companies to have an audit committee, therefore, this variable will not be affecting the 
results (Financial Reporting Council, 2012). Dividends control variables has also been 
excluded since dividends is considered as a one way of measuring performance of 
companies, therefore, including it in the regression model as a control variable may lead to 
a bias in the regression results.   
Starting with the board level factors, this study controls for the number of board 
meetings, the duality of the CEO and chairperson, and the board size (e.g., Di Pietra, 
Grambovas, Raonic, & Riccaboni, 2008; Finkelstein & D’aveni, 1994; Florackis & Ozkan, 
2009). Previous studies indicate that when there is duality between the CEO and the 
chairperson, the CEO will have more power, which will cause independent directors to be 
less effective in monitoring executives. This would consequently affect a firm’s 
performance negatively (Yermack, 1996; Carter et al., 2003; Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 
2008; Duchin, Matsusaka, & Ozbas, 2010; Bhagat & Bolton 2008).  
Ocak and Özden (2017) studied the number of board meetings in the context of 
Turkey and concluded that the proportions of independent members and women on board 
are positively related to the number of board meetings. Similarly, board size is supposed 
to have a positive relationship with organizational performance. As per Ali (2016), the 
larger the board, the more directors are involved in the monitoring role of the boardroom, 
which consequently affects organizational performance. Ali (2016) also pointed out that 
having a larger boardroom will add a value to a firm by providing access to a wide range 
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of expertise to help in performing various complicated roles, resulting in a greater 
efficiency and improved performance.  
With respect to the presence of nomination committee, a study on 210 Swiss public 
companies conducted by Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve and Hu (2006) explored the 
relationship between the presence of a nomination committee and its effect on board 
diversity. The study followed a longitudinal methodology to incorporate data from 2001 to 
2003 and the results were as follows. They found that presence of a nomination committee 
in a company would increase the number of independent and foreign directors, regardless 
of their gender. In addition, having a nomination committee will also affect  firm’s board 
diversity in terms of nationalities and not educational background. This has an indirect 
relationship with the firm’s performance. Since this present study’s hypotheses cover board 
diversity and performance, this variable that was found to be significant in the literature 
was included as a control variable. 
Corporate governance, in general, is a tool use for controlling the company, as 
previously mentioned. The corporate governance committee in particular is a way to 
maintain this control and transparency. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no previous 
studies have incorporated the presence of a corporate governance committee when 
measuring performance in the context of diversity. However, it is included here because of 
its effect on financial performance in general, as shown by Farahat (2014).  
The literature has discussed NEDs in the context of two main theories when 
determining firm performance. To start with the first one, agency theory predicts that the 
separation of control and ownership leads to self-interests decisions by managers (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). In fact, it appears to be practical to include a large number of NEDs in 
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the boardroom (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; John & Senbet, 1998; Chen & Huang, 2014). 
NEDs are expected to perform independently in their roles of monitoring, supervising, and 
controlling the managerial activities to resolve problems caused by the self-interested 
behavior of other managers. As a result, it is expected that the presence of NEDs may help 
performance to improve (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Whereas agency theory discusses the monitoring and controlling roles of NEDs to 
solve agency problems, the resource dependency theory focuses on using the resources 
contributed to the board by NEDs. In fact, the boardroom is utilizing the NEDs to gain 
resources from the outside environment via NED mediation (Pfeffer, 1972). As far as this 
approach is concerned, the NEDs are expected to help firms in their strategic decision-
making process (Westphal, Gulati, & Shortell, 1997). In addition, NEDs also help firms to 
acquire the necessary information and help smooth approaches to a wider network of 
sources of finance in the markets (Peng, 2004). 
Similarly, the study has also incorporated control variables relating to the firm itself 
that include: level of leverage (total debt to total equity ratio) and firm size, expressed by 
the value of total assets (log) as per Terjesen et al. (2016). The main reason for considering 
the leverage variable is because it affects performance either positively or negatively, 
depending on the combination of circumstances, including the company’s situation. 
Leverage by its nature is an obligation against the companies because it increases pressure 
to ensure consistent profitability (Sarkar & Sarkar, 2008). As a result, companies are 
expected not to invest in risky projects to avoid the possibility of suffering a loss (Ferri & 
Jones, 1979). Such decisions are, in fact, aligned with shareholders’ interests from one side 
and also increase the company’s performance from the other side.  On the other hand, 
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Nguyen & Phan (2016), who studied the relationship between financial leverage and 
performance in the context of Vietnam, found an inverse relationship because of the 
country’s weak corporate governance (i.e. the absence of an outside board of directors, the 
absence of information disclosure, and the presence of asymmetric information) and 
ineffective law enforcement. These factors led to the failure by the board of directors to 
control and align the interests of shareholders and managers. This allowed company 
managers to freely invest in risky projects and unprofitable projects, which resulted in a 
decrease in the firm’s performance.  
Concerning the total value of a firm’s assets, this has been used as a way to measure 
firm size as per Ararat, Helaly, and Shehata (2017). Coles et al. (2008) argued that the 
larger the organization, the higher the number of entrenched senior managers at the 
boardroom level who have higher authority in nominating boardroom members. As a 
result, they will be in control either to increase or decrease board diversification for their 
own compensation, overlooking the company’s interests. 
Finally, a dummy variable was created to represent the year effect. This study 
created four variables, each representing one particular year: YER1, YER2, YER3, and 
YER4 for 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively. For example, for the year 2013, X1 
variable had an observation of 1 for all companies in the year 2013 but for other years, all 
companies had observations of 0. This methodology is helpful for determining the presence 
of any effect of the year on the results. Besides, it also helps in determining the presence 
of any improvements in a firm’s performance over time as a result of board diversity.  
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CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The data analysis and results chapter is divided into two main parts. The first one 
covers the descriptive statistics along with the Pearson’s correlations, whereas the second 
part presents the regression analysis. Hence, the goal of this chapter is for the reader to 
understand how the four hypotheses are driven and interpreted through the various 
statistical analyses.  
Descriptive statistics provide an overall understanding of the sample and its 
distribution by giving preliminary information that is helpful for proceeding with the 
regression analysis. In addition, Pearson’s correlations have been used to identify the 
strength and the direction of the correlation between independent and control variables.  
The second part of the chapter (the regression analysis) is divided into two models 
that consider two different proxies for measuring firm performances: Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
The regression analyses will help us to examine the effect the independent and control 
variables on the dependent variable.  
One of the regression outputs, Variance inflation factors (VIF), will help the study 
to identify multi-collinearity issues through an examination of the VIF values for the 
independent variables and cross-checking these with the Pearson’s correlations. The 
absence of multicollinearity problems usually leads to better interpretation of the results 
when identifying the relationships between the dependent variable (firm performance) and 
the independent variables (board diversity factors).  However, the presence of multi-
collinearity would result in misleading results, which would make it difficult for the study 
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to assess the influence of the independent variables on the dependent ones (Katrutsa & 
Strijov, 2017). The software that was used to conduct the two analyses (i.e. descriptive and 
regression) was SPSS version 25.  
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 provides insights into the data, their distribution and normality. To start 
with the data skewness and normality, all continuous variables were tested for normality, 
From the skewness results in Table 5.1, it can be concluded that all the continuous variables 
are normally distributed.  This is evident from the kurtosis and skewness statistics values, 
which are below ±3. The importance of having normally distributed data is that they help 
in predicting and forecasting data, as well as identifying the presence of data trends. 
Additionally, normality is one of the requirements to run the linear regression model. Since 
the regression model provides an equation describing the relationship between two or more 
variables, it provides a technique to predict the value of the dependent variable, given a 
value for the independent variable. Therefore, having non-normally distributed data will 
not result in a valid regression model (Shanmugam & Chattamvelli, 2015).  Table 5.2 
provides an explanation of the variables in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 
 
Descriptive Statistics of the Study Variables  
 
 
 
Mini Max Mean 
Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Independent 
Variables Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
FBM 0.0000  57.1429  20.6076  10.2701  0.2580  0.0710  0.2400  0.1430  
EMGD 0.0000  100.00  13.5960  14.5317  1.2800  0.0740  2.7520  0.1470  
BSD 9.7500  100.00 59.5516  18.4854  -0.0310 0.0720  -0.2290 0.1430  
BT 1.4600 13.0100  5.7714  2.3046  0.0000  0.0730  -0.0870 0.1460  
Control 
Variables         
BOD 3.0000  21.000  9.1341  2.5163  0.7730  0.0710  1.4240  0.1430  
MTGS 1.0000 16.690 8.1844  2.6886  0.0000  0.0700  -0.0820 0.1400  
NED 10.000  100.00  72.6900  13.6390  0.0860  0.0760  0.4280  0.1520  
DCC 0.0600  0.5700  0.1013  0.1451  2.9340  0.0710  6.6190  0.1430  
NC 0.0000  1.0000  0.9745  0.0500  -6.4970 0.0710  40.2760  0.1430  
CG 0.0000  1.0000  0.1519  0.3591  1.9420  0.0710  1.7760  0.1430  
FSIZE 4.9956  12.2523  9.0520  1.0244  0.0310  0.0680  1.4990  0.1350  
LEV 0.5100 8.0800  0.9694  2.1766  0.1920  0.0690  -0.4150 0.1370  
YER 1 0.0000  1.0000  0.2500  0.4330  1.1560  0.0680  -0.6650 0.1350  
YER 2 0.0000  1.0000  0.2500  0.4330  1.1560  0.0680  -0.6650 0.1350  
YER 3 0.0000  1.0000  0.2500  0.4330  1.1560  0.0680  -0.6650 0.1350  
YER 4 0.0000  1.0000  0.2500  0.4330  1.1560  0.0680  -0.6650 0.1350  
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Table 5.2 
 
Definition of the Independent and Control Variables 
 
  
Independent variables Symbols 
Percentage of female directors FBM 
Executive members’ gender 
diversity 
EMGD 
Background and skills diversity BSD 
Average board tenure BT 
Control variables  
Board size BOD 
Number of meetings MTGS 
Non-executive directors NED 
Duality of CEO and chairperson DCC 
Presence of a nomination 
Committee 
NC 
Presence of a corporate 
governance committee 
CG 
Firm size FSIZE 
Leverage LEV 
Year YER 
 
However, some control variables, including CEO duality and the presence of a 
nomination committee have kurtosis statistics above the value of 3. This is because they 
are dummy variables and are not expected to be normally distributed for a number of 
reasons. In fact, the presence of a nomination committee is an ordinal variable that has 
observations of either 0 or 1, where 1 represents the presence of a committee. The presence 
of a nomination committee is critical and majority of the FTSE 350 companies are keen to 
have one. As per Grant Thornton’s (2016) corporate governance review, the FTSE 350 list 
had only 14 companies with no nomination committee (as of December 2015). 
Furthermore, the UK corporate governance code published in April 2016 emphasized the 
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roles and importance of the nomination committee. Therefore, it is strongly expected that 
majority of companies will have this committee on the board.  
Similarly, the duality of the CEO and the chairperson role has been addressed in 
the UK corporate governance code, where the code provision stated that the roles of 
chairperson and the CEO should be exercised by two different individuals. In our study, 
the CEO duality variable was ordinal as well, where an observation of 0 indicates 
separation. Therefore, the kurtosis results were expected. In fact, it is not practical to call 
this skewness because of the corporate governance codes in the UK.  
The descriptive statistics provided important findings regarding the mean. To start 
with the main independent variables, Table 5.1 shows that the average board tenure was 
5.7 years which is lower than the results in Huang and Hilary’s (2018) study, which found 
it to be 8.7 years among S&P 1500 firms from 1998 to 2010. Huang and Hilary (2018) 
found that the optimum number of years for realizing the benefits of board tenure in 
improving firm performance is approximately 9. The percentage of board background and 
skills diversity was 59%. Finally, the average proportion of female board members was 
equal to only 21%. This result is better than that found for the Netherlands and Denmark, 
where Marinova, Plantenga, and Remery (2016) found that the average percentage of 
women in the boardroom was 5.4% only. Similarly, Sabatier (2015), who studied female 
representation at the board level in the context of French Cotation Assistée en Continu 
(CAC40) companies, found an average of 15%. In the context of Egypt female 
representation on the board was 9.22% (Ararat et al., 2017). Similarly, executive members 
gender diversity has revealed a maximum of 100% which means that there are companies 
who have all its executive members are females only, however, the average for the same 
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diversity of 13.5% across the pooled sample. In fact, this gives an indication that the 
majority of the results revealed from board gender member diversity are mainly attributed 
to the executive members only. 
As far as the control variables are concerned, it was found that the average number 
of board meetings during a year is eight. This represents a meeting every 45 days. Since 
the boards are conducting frequent meetings during the year, it is expected that the boards’ 
decision-making process will be enhanced along with the strategic decisions relating to 
monitoring and managing the company’s resources, which will be reflected in the 
company’s earnings and profits.  
This study found that the average boardroom size was nine members, which reflects 
an increase in the average board size from 2009 to 2016 (seen members in 2009, as per 
Guest (2009)).  The change seen between 2009 and 2016 represents a 28% increase in 
boardroom members in the UK. This increase could be caused by an increase in the 
complexity of operations in the dynamic business environment in the UK.  
The average leverage of FTSE 350 companies in the sample revealed a ratio of 
96%. A similar study conducted in Egypt revealed a leverage percentage of 57.25% (Ararat 
et al., 2017). Ventilã and Nenu (2015) found a similar average leverage to Egypt for 150 
Romanian companies, namely a leverage ratio of 66%. However, because of the differences 
in the economic circumstances and the nature of business in these two countries, these 
differences in the ratios in the UK and both Egypt and Romania is expected.  
In addition, on average, the percentage of NEDs was 72.7%. NEDs are always an 
area of debate as to whether they increase or decrease the company’s growth (Hutchinson, 
2001). In fact, the results revealed in the descriptive statistics for the NEDs are consistent 
  
   
58 
 
with prior literature, where a study undertaken in the Netherlands and Denmark revealed 
65.7% and 42.4% respectively. In Vietnam, it was found to be 58.25% (Nguyen and Phan 
2016). 
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5.3 Pearson Correlation Analysis 
Table 5.3 
Pearson’s Correlations among the Variables 
 
  
 
ROA Tobin’s Q FBM EMGD BSD BT BOD MTGS NED DCC NC CG FSIZE LEV YER 1 YER 2 YER 3 YER 4 
ROA 1     
 
                            
Tobin’s Q – 1  
 
              
FBM 
0.0996*
** 
0.0705*** 1 
 
 
 
            
EMGD 
0.1395*
** 
0.1281*** 0.3213*** 
1 
 
 
            
BSD 
-
0.0153*
* 
0.0098* -0.0627*** 0.0120** 1 
 
            
BT 
0.0728*
* 
0.0168** -0.2023*** -0.0885*** -0.0627*** 1             
BOD 
-
0.0963*
** 
-0.0470** 0.1272*** 0.074** -0.1230*** -0.1064*** 1   
 
        
MTGS 
-
0.0582*
** 
0.0097* -0.0333** 0.037** 0.0728*** -0.1834*** 
0.044*
* 
1  
 
        
NED 0.0038* 0.0256* 0.0003* -0.019** 0.0076* 0.0087* 
-
0.030*
* 
-0.120*** 1          
DCC 0.0054* 0.0068* -0.1556*** -0.053*** 0.1479*** 0.2994*** 
-
0.078*
** 
0.017** 
-
0.141*
** 
1         
NC 
-
0.0070* 
0.0375** 0.1091*** 0.062** 0.0090* -0.2432*** 
0.111*
** 
0.155*** 
-
0.188*
** 
-
0.036*
* 
1 
 
      
CG 
-
0.0828*
** 
-0.0583*** 0.0819*** 0.130*** 0.0105** -0.0468** 
0.314*
** 
0.077*** 
0.109*
** 
0.046*
* 
0.064
** 
1       
FSIZE 
-
0.278**
* 
-0.2643*** 0.2024*** 0.007* -0.0765* -0.1525*** 
0.376*
** 
0.097*** 
0.051*
** 
-
0.059*
* 
0.005
* 
0.239
*** 
1      
LEV 
-
0.1154*
** 
-0.0633*** 0.0314** 0.097*** -0.0239** -0.0277** 
0.351*
** 
0.162*** 
-
0.080*
** 
-
0.051*
** 
0.085
*** 
0.084
*** 
0.191**
* 
1     
YER 1 -0.001* -0.001* 0.0012* 0.040** 0.0006* -0.002* 
-
0.085*
* 
-0.028** 
0.062*
** 
-
0.009* 
-
0.036
** 
-
0.024
** 
0.012** 0.002* 1    
YER 2 -0.003* -0.003* 0.0076* 0.003* 0.0004* -0.0001* 
-
0.048* 
-0.045** 0.010* 
-
0.016*
* 
-
0.023
** 
-
0.024
** 
-0.004* 0.016** -0.333*** 1   
YER 3 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0056* -0.032** 0.0004* 0.0035* 0.033* 0.020** 
-
0.024*
* 
0.012*
* 
0.003
* 
0.003
* 
0.001* 0.003* 
-
0.333**
* 
-
0.333**
* 
1  
YER 4 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0031* -0.013** 0.0003* 0.0023* 
0.113*
** 
0.059*** 
-
0.050*
* 
0.016*
* 
0.062
*** 
0.050
** 
-0.008* 
-
0.021** 
-
0.333**
* 
-
0.333**
* 
-
0.333**
* 
1 
 
 
*     Correlation at 0.01 
 **   Correlation at 0.05 
 *** Correlation at 0.1 
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Table 5.3 did not reveal very high correlations among the dependent, independent, 
and control variables. Evans (1996) classified the absolute correlation coefficients into five 
categories as follows: 0.00–0.19, very weak; 0.2–0.39, weak; 0.4–0.59, moderate; 0.6–
0.79, strong; 0.8–1.0, very strong. Table 5.3 indicates that all of the correlation coefficients 
fall into the very weak and weak categories and therefore, there is a weak linear relationship 
between the dependent, independent and control variables.  
5.4 Regression Analysis 
The regression analysis follows from the descriptive and correlation analyses in the 
previous section. The regression analysis will be done for the two models to investigate 
both of the dependent variables alone, followed by a comparison between the results. The 
first output covers Tobin’s Q and the second one covers ROA. The regression analysis will 
also include collinearity statistics to cross-check for the presence of collinearity issues by 
interpreting the VIF values.  
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Table 5.4 
 
Regression Analysis for the Tobin’s Q and ROA Models 
 
 
 
Variables 
Tobin’s Q Return on Assets 
Beta Sig. VIF Beta Sig. VIF 
Board gender diversity 0.2040  
0.0000 
*** 1.2700  0.2080  
0.0000 
*** 1.2700  
Executive members’ gender 
diversity -0.0170 0.5200  1.1320  0.0540  0.0710 * 1.1320  
Board background and skills 
-0.0910 
0.0010 
*** 1.1720  -0.0820 
0.0070 
*** 1.1710  
Board tenure 0.0260  0.3410  1.1660  0.1040  
0.0010 
*** 1.1660  
Board size 
0.1930  
0.0000 
*** 1.8010  0.0860  
0.0230 
** 1.8020  
Number of board meetings 0.1590  
0.0000 
*** 1.5100  0.1180  
0.0010 
*** 1.5130  
Non-executive directors -0.0390 0.1610  1.2650  -0.0010 0.9720  1.2630  
CEO duality 0.0060  0.8180  1.1210  0.0370  0.2160  1.1220  
Nomination committee 
0.0680  
0.0090 
*** 1.0850  -0.0100 0.7430  1.0850  
Corporate governance 
Committee 0.0520  
0.0700 
** 1.3230  -0.0120 0.7150  1.3300  
Firm size -0.8270 
0.0000 
*** 2.7530  -0.5060 
0.0000 
*** 2.7720  
Leverage 
-0.1270 
0.0000 
*** 1.3000  -0.2690 
0.0000 
*** 1.3020  
Year 1 -0.0140 0.6540  1.5000  -0.0050 0.8770  1.4940  
Year 3 0.0120  0.6920  1.4690  0.0420  0.2130  1.4620  
Year 4 0.0470  0.1260  1.4860  0.0500  0.1470  1.4820  
Constant  0.0000   0.0000  
𝑅2 0.492   0.355   
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.483   0.343   
***  Significance level at 1% 
**    Significance level at 5% 
*      Significance level at 10% 
  
The regression analysis will start with the interpretation of VIF values and the 
overall statistical significance of the Tobin’s Q and ROA regression models. It will start 
with a small overview of the independent and control variables’ level of significance, 
followed by a detailed interpretation.  
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The regression analyses in Table 5.4 revealed the absence of multi-collinearity 
issues within the independent and control variables as measured by the VIF values. This is 
agreement with the Pearson correlation results presented earlier, as all the VIF values had 
a maximum of 2.772 and minimum of 1.085. Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt. (2011) indicated 
that if the VIF values lie above 5, regression becomes problematic.  
Tobin’s Q and ROA regression models results have revealed mixed results 
compared with prior literature. Starting at the hypothesis level, it can be noted that Tobin’s 
Q model has an adjusted R2 value (coefficient of determination) of 48.3%. This means that 
the variations in companies’ performance are 48.3% justified and properly explained by 
the influential independent variables considered in our model. Nevertheless, 51.7% of the 
variations are not explained by the model. However, the ROA regression model revealed 
an adjusted R2 value of 34.3%. Similar results were obtained by other scholars, including 
Shehata et al. (2017), who studied board gender diversity and its effect on firm performance 
in the context of the UK and revealed an R2 of 50.7%. Therefore, it can be said that the 
coefficient of determination resulting from the Tobin’s Q and ROA models’ analyses are 
similar to those in the literature in terms of their value and interpretation.  
The R2 results mean that the results provided by the regression models hypothesized 
are not randomized and represent the variations in the dependent variable arising from the 
independent ones. Therefore, predictions and estimations about the changes in the 
dependent variables by using these models are possible. The same result for the level of 
significance was found by the majority of other studies (e.g. Doldor, 2012; Martin et al., 
2008; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013; Rao & Tilt, 2016; Ooi et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018; Pechersky, 
2016; Huang & Hilary, 2018; Siciliano, 1996).  
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For the independent and control variables, mixed results have been reported in the 
literature that contradict with each other when considering performance as measured by 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. Considering Tobin’s Q and the significance of each of the 
independent and control variables, it can be seen that two independent and six control 
variables are deemed to be significant, with either positive or negative associations with 
firm performance. Factors significant at the 1% level include the following factors: board 
background and skills, board gender diversity, board size, number of board meetings, firm 
size, the presence of a nomination committee, and the level of leverage. At the 5% level of 
significance, the presence of a corporate governance committee was the only factor 
identified. None of the variables was significant at 10%. 
ROA, on the other hand, revealed four independent variables and four control 
variables with either statistically significant positive or negative associations with firm 
performance. These are: board tenure, board gender diversity, executive members gender 
diversity, and board background and skills diversity. Control variables found to be 
significant were the number of board meetings, firm size, and level of leverage, which were 
significant at 1%, and board size being significant at 5%. 
5.4.1 Independent Variables 
Board gender diversity, as the first independent variable, had a statistically 
significant relationship at the 1% level with firm performance and a coefficient of 0.2040 
and 0.2080 for Tobin’s Q and ROA respectively. These results indicate a significant 
positive association between boardroom gender diversity and firm financial performance. 
In other words, the higher the percentage of female representation on the board of directors, 
the higher the firm’s earnings and profits. Siciliano (1996), Martin et al. (2008), Kiliç and 
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Kuzey (2016), Gordini and Rancati (2017), Low et al. (2015), and Terjesen et al., (2016) 
also found the same relationship, where board gender diversity was found to be positively 
significant  at 1%) with social performance on the one hand and positively linked with 
company value on the other (Carter et al., 2003). Conversely, Rose (2007) found a non-
significant relationship between the two variables. The latter conclusion was also reported 
by Smith et al. (2006) and Vob (2015), who concluded that board gender diversity had no 
effect on firm financial performance in their contexts. As per Joecks et al. (2013) board 
gender diversity is important and influential in specific industries only, such as financials, 
telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, consumer goods, and healthcare. Although they 
have not tested this relationship empirically, it is most likely that the inconsistency between 
the literature results is a consequence of the different natures of the companies in the 
sample. 
This study introduced the executive member gender diversity factor, which has not 
been studied before, to explore whether gender diversity within a certain group of board 
members will affect firm performance. Although the findings were not consistent between 
the ROA and Tobin’s Q, however, it is still important to shed light on this variable as it 
may still be beneficial for future research. ROA performance proxy has revealed that 
Executive members gender diversity is significantly affecting firm’s performance at 10%. 
This relationship between the latter variable has been indicated as a positive association 
where the coefficient of determination had a value of 0.054. In other words, the higher the 
diversity in the executive board members in terms of their gender, the higher the expected 
performance on the company. The interpretation for this relationship is into some extent 
similar to the general gender board diversity, where females are deemed as more 
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professional and has a unique approach for monitoring the company. As a result, it is 
expected that their approach is contributing to the firm’s wealth increase and performance 
consequently. On the contrary, Tobin’s Q as the market-based performance proxy has not 
revealed any association between the latter and Executive member gender diversity, a 
possible reason might be way of measuring the performance indicator itself, since the 
market based performance indicators are being affected by multiple factors and not the 
earning solely. Hence, Hypothesis II which assumes the presence of positive association 
between executive members gender diversity on firm’s performance will be partially 
accepted since it is accepted by one performance proxy (ROA) and rejected by (Tobin’s 
Q). 
The third independent variable, which is board background and skills, was found 
to have a significant relationship with firm performance at the 1% level of significance in 
both regression models. It is important to understand the magnitude of diversity’s impact 
on firm’s performance and whether was it positive or negative. Board background and 
skills diversity had a coefficient estimate of –0.091 and –0.082 for the Tobin’s Q and ROA 
results respectively, which means that the more diversified the boardroom was in terms of 
background and skills, the lower the firm performance. However, this result contradicts 
Murray (1989), who found a non-significant relationship between firm performance and 
board background diversity. It also disagrees with other authors such as Argenti (1976), 
Bantel (1993), and Mahadeo et al. (2012), who found a positive relationship between board 
background and skills diversity and firm performance. In addition, Murray (1989) found a 
potential indirect effect on firm performance through improvements in the communication 
skills needed to enhance a company’s growth and profits. The discrepancies between our 
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results and the literature could have arisen from many factors. For example, let us consider 
the time effect and the context itself. The abovementioned studies were conducted in the 
20th century, except for Mahadeo et al. (2012). In addition, the context of the present study 
is totally different from that of these studies, which affects the regression results. This is 
particularly relevant, given the effect of national economy, which is not part of this study’s 
scope. From another angle, background and skills diversity is considered to be a cultural 
diversity factor, which, in some circumstances, may lead to a negative influence on the 
board’s performance and thus the firm’s performance. In the case of cultural diversity (i.e. 
background diversity), different opinions and thoughts are shared by board members. Each 
of the members is likely to take a different approach to problem-solving and brings his/her 
unique cultural knowledge to the situation. This can create communication difficulties 
among them can lead to personality clashes. Personal opinions and point of views are most 
likely to be interpreted as personal attacks or even promotion of hidden agendas. These 
perceptions reduce the board’s effectiveness, their commitment, and, most importantly, 
mutual trust. Therefore, board cultural diversity, represented by background and skills 
diversity in this study, might cause a lack of trust among board members with different 
backgrounds, where trust will be shared between members with the same background but 
not other members. Thus, it can be concluded that Hypothesis 3, which assumes a positive 
association between board background and skills and firm performance, is rejected.  
Finally, is we examine average board tenure, Huang and Hilary (2018) studied its 
relationship with firm performance in the context of S&P 1500 companies and found an 
inverted U-shaped relationship. However, in the Tobin’s Q regression model results in this 
study, it can be seen that the board tenure dependent variable is non-significant. A possible 
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justification for this result may the fact that the boardroom does not need tenure diversity 
because experienced members with solid backgrounds are needed to drive the company to 
success. Huang and Hilary (2018) investigated this in detail, illustrating that diversity 
might not be the optimum decision to consider when nominating board of directors 
members. Experienced members with solid backgrounds are needed, with the optimum 
tenure length being 9 years; tenures below and above 9 years either affect performance and 
managerial decisions negatively or are neutral with no significant effect on performance 
(Huang & Hilary, 2018).  
On the other hand, the ROA regression model results revealed a positive association 
between average board tenure and firm’s performance at a significance level of 1% and a 
coefficient estimate of 0.104. This result contradicts the Tobin’s Q results. A possible 
reason for this contradiction may be as follows. The performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
is based on the market value of a company by determining its outstanding shares and the 
share price by year-end. On the other hand, ROA is based on net profit. The inconsistency 
in the regression analyses may be caused by the ability of the experienced managers to 
generate profits from using the assets wisely; however, these profits are not being reflected 
in share prices. In fact, profit is only one factor that determines share prices among a vast 
number of factors (Mehr-un-Nisa & Nishat, 2012). Interest rates, dividends paid, inflation 
rate, money supply, gross domestic product growth, and share turnover ratios are 
significant factors that may affect share prices, apart from the profits generated (Mehr-un-
Nisa & Nishat, 2012). 
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Because of the inconsistency between the two regression model results, Hypothesis 
4, which assumes a positive association between board tenure diversity and firm 
performance, is partially accepted. 
It can be seen that the results of the regression analysis are in line with resource 
dependency theory. The different genders and the different backgrounds and skills along 
with the different tenures of board members are bringing more diversified personnel to the 
board, which helps to create wider connections from each of the board members in order 
to increase the company’s performance. This answers the research question and addresses 
the research problem.  
5.4.2 Control Variables 
Although the control variables are not the main scope of our study, it was found 
that the majority of them significantly affected firm performance either positively or 
negatively. To start with the variables were significant in both the Tobin’s Q and ROA 
models, it was evident that the number of board meetings and board size were positively 
significant at 1% and 5% respectively. However, firm size and level of leverage were 
negatively significant at 1%. In other words, the bigger the firm’s size, and the higher the 
level of leverage in a firm, the lower the company’s performance. These results were 
consistent with previous studies conducted by Ruigrok et al. (2006), Di Pietra et al. (2008), 
Finkelstein and D’aveni (1994), Florackis and Ozkan (2009), and Ocak & Özden (2017).  
Other variables that were deemed to be non-significant included CEO duality, year, 
and the percentage of NEDs. The CEO duality result was inconsistent with those of several 
other studies (Di Pietra et al., 2008; Finkelstein & D’aveni, 1994; Florackis & Ozkan, 
2009), whereas the NED results were inconsistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976). It is 
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also important to discuss the results for the year variable. Although year was not found to 
be a significant factor in either regression model, its level of significance has been 
improving from year to year, with significance values of 0.877, 0.213 and 0.147 (ROA) 
and 0.654,0.692 and 0.126 (Tobin’s Q) for 2013, 2015, and 2016.   
On the other hand, the two variables that were inconsistent between Tobin’s Q and 
ROA are the presence of a nomination committee, and the presence of a corporate 
governance committee. Although the presence of corporate governance and nomination 
committees affected firm performance in the Tobin’s Q model (Ruigrok et al., 2006; Di 
Pietra et al., 2008; Finkelstein & D’aveni, 1994; Florackis & Ozkan, 2009; Ocak & Özden, 
2017), they were deemed to be insignificant in the ROA model. The reason for this 
inconsistency might be the way of measuring performance. Since Tobin’s Q formula is 
based on the market cap of each entity, it considers its reporting quality and stock prices; 
since stock prices are fluctuating based on the information and quality reporting of each 
entity, it is strongly influenced by the presence of both corporate governance and 
nomination committees. Therefore, we can conclude that the presence of corporate 
governance and nomination committees affect the entity’s quality reporting and therefore 
the demand on the stocks, which leads to increased or decreased market value, and thus 
Tobin’s Q.  
5.5 Summary of Results 
The results of the data were more or less as expected. Both regression analysis 
models revealed that there is a positive relationship between the percentage of female board 
representation and firm performance a measured via two proxies: ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
What the results show was consistent with some previous literature but contradicted with 
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other studies. Therefore, based on this study’s results, it can be concluded that the 
hypothesis of board gender diversity affecting firm performance is accepted.  
With regard to board background and skills, the results were consistent in both 
regression analyses, where a negative association between board background and skills 
diversity and firm performance was found. In fact, this is not consistent in terms of the 
influence’s direction with prior literature, such as the studies by Murray (1989), Argenti 
(1976), Bantel (1993), Mahadeo et al. (2012), Simons and Pelled (1999), and Erhardt et 
al., (2003). Thus it can be concluded that there is a negative relationship between board 
background and skills diversity, and firm performance. As a result, the second hypothesis 
in this study is rejected, not in terms of the significance level but in terms of the direction.  
Finally, the third independent variable (board tenure diversity) does not appear to 
affect performance as measured by one performance measurement proxy (Tobin’s Q) but 
does appear to have an effect on the other proxy (ROA). Therefore, this study will partially 
accept the third hypothesis.  
5.6 Financial versus Non-Financial Firms 
Further analysis was conducted to reflect the industry effect or if companies’ 
performance is affected by the four main independent variables by the same direction and 
magnitude when we different between financial and non-financial institutions. The 
importance of this investigation is to concisely determine to what extent board diversity is 
influencing firms’ financial performance in different types of companies in the UK.  
The regression model below (Eqn. 3) shows the same dependent, independent, and 
control variables as discussed before; however, it also includes the industry effect. The 
latter is a dummy variable, which represents the type of the firm (i.e. whether it was 
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financial or non-financial). If the company was financial, it was given an observation of 1 
but 0 otherwise. This helps in the data analysis by identifying if board gender diversity, 
board tenure, and background and skills diversity impact financial performance in both 
industries either similarly or differently. This part of the study will introduce the industry 
variable and provides the regression model results and its interpretation: 
PERF=β0+β1 FBM+ β2 EMGD +β3 BSD+β4 BT+β5 BOD+β6 MTGS+β7 NED+β8 
DCC+β9 NC+β10 GC +β11 FSIZE+β12 LEV+β13 YER+β14 FIN (Eqn. 3), 
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Table 5.5 
 
Regression Results for the Model Including Industry Type  
 
 
Variables 
Tobin’s Q Return on assets 
Beta Sig. VIF Beta Sig. VIF 
Board gender 
diversity 0.2040  
0.0000 
*** 1.2750  0.2040  0.0000 *** 1.2750  
Executive members’ 
gender diversity -0.0170 0.5200  1.1320  0.0540  0.0700 * 1.1320  
Board background 
and skills -0.0900 
0.0010 
*** 1.1830  -0.0870 0.0040 *** 1.1820  
Board tenure 0.0260  0.3410  1.1660  0.1050  0.0010 *** 1.1660  
Board size 
0.1930  
0.0000 
*** 1.8030  0.0880  0.0200 ** 1.8040  
Number of board 
meetings 0.1590  
0.0000 
*** 1.5120  0.1200  0.0010 *** 1.5150  
Non-executive 
directors -0.0390 0.1640  1.2750  -0.0060 0.8580  1.2730  
CEO duality 0.0060  0.8190  1.1230  0.0390  0.1930  1.1230  
Nomination 
committee 0.0680  
0.0090 
*** 1.0880  -0.0070 0.8140  1.0890  
Corporate governance 
committee 0.0520  
0.0700 
** 1.3250  -0.0100 0.7570  1.3310  
Firm size -0.8260 
0.0000 
*** 2.7830  -0.5140 0.0000 *** 2.7980  
Leverage 
-0.1270 
0.0000 
*** 1.3090  -0.2640 0.0000 *** 1.3100  
Year 1 -0.0140 0.6540  1.5000  -0.0040 0.9050  1.4950  
Year 3 0.0120  0.6920  1.4690  0.0410  0.2220  1.4620  
Year 4 0.0470  0.1260  1.4860  0.0500  0.1470  1.4820  
Financial and non-
Financial -0.0010 0.9750  1.0460  0.0470  0.1030  1.0440  
Constant  0.0000   0.0000  
𝑅2 0.492   0.357   
Adjusted 𝑅2 0.482   0.344   
***  Significance level at 1% 
**    Significance level at 5% 
*      Significance level at 10% 
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Tobin’s Q and ROA regression results show no significant differences in the impact 
of board diversity on both types of company. In addition, company type had an 
insignificant effect on firm performance when all four diversity factors (tenure, background 
and skills, gender, executive members gender) were considered.  
This study’s results are consistent with the prior study by Sabatier (2015), who 
studied board gender diversity in the context of French CAC40 listed companies and did 
not find diversity to impact performance differently between business segments. However, 
it also contradicts other studies such as Moulin and Point (2012) and Le Breton-Miller and 
Miller (2006) who studied the same context (French CAC40 listed companies) with the 
same diversity variables and revealed the opposite results. It is difficult to assess the effect 
of board diversity in certain groups of companies because of the major differences among 
each business segment. In fact, Tobin’s Q and ROA are completely different ways of 
measuring performance; therefore, it is possible to report either similar or different results.  
Future research should incorporate yearly analysis on both financial and non-
financial sectors separately to determine the impact of diversity on firm’s performance. 
This should refine the conclusions and solidify the interpretations presented here.    
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides a summary of the study including the conclusions, practical 
implications, contributions, limitations, and avenues for future research. 
6.1 Summary  
This study aimed to examine the relationship between diversity among boardroom 
members in terms of gender, executive members gender, background and skills, and tenure, 
and firm financial performance. Resource dependency theory was used to formulate the 
four main hypotheses of this study, where each of them suggested a positive association 
between a board diversity factor and firm financial performance. The empirical results 
showed that female representation at the boardroom level is positively associated with firm 
performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q in the context of FTSE 350 companies in 
the UK. This result is in agreement with the prior literature, as discussed in Chapter 5. As 
a result, Hypothesis 1 is accepted. Similarly, executive members’ gender diversity was 
found to positively affecting firm’s performance when the performance proxy was 
measured by ROA but not Tobin’s Q. As a result hypothesis II was partially accepted. 
On the contrary, board diversity in terms of background and skills was found to be 
negatively associated with firm performance and thus the third hypothesis was rejected. 
Last but not least, the fourth hypothesis related to board tenure diversification has been 
partially accepted since it was significant when measuring the performance via ROA but 
not Tobin’s Q.  
All in all, board diversity is all about bringing boardroom members with different 
demographic attributes and characteristics and backgrounds to ensure a well-balanced 
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board of directors, which will improve resource utilization, improve the decision-making 
process, and bring about an overall improvement in a firm’s financial earnings or 
performance.  
6.2 Contributions and Implications 
This study’s findings can be useful for different parties. First of all, it is highly 
beneficial for companies in order to know how to benefit from boardroom diversity and its 
impact on their performance. In fact, diversity can be achieved from more than one 
dimension including these ones highlighted in this study and others that were not 
approached. The idea of diversifying the board is to guide companies on the optimum way 
of diversifying its boardroom from more than one perspective at a time which ideally shall 
reap economic benefits that include but not limited to improving in decision making, 
utilizing resources in a more efficient way, increase companies awareness of equality in 
rights, satisfy stakeholders’ needs, and finally improve the company’s overall performance. 
Second, the findings are useful for governmental use since it addresses one of the 
critical topics in corporate governance. It may help in determining the percentage of female 
occupation of boardroom seats that, in the future, will help to set a female occupancy quota, 
whenever needed. Although there have been multiple reports that identifies the importance 
of having a certain quota for the presence of females in the boardroom, however, till date 
there has been no action with regard to FTSE350 though there has been for FTSE100. 
Having said so, this study is contributing by providing insights on the importance of having 
female being presented in the boardroom that is in a way or the other affecting companies’ 
performance positively as statistically shown in this study. 
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Third, the results and findings of this study will equip stakeholders in general and 
shareholders in particular with needful information for assessing a company’s performance 
and its response to board diversity. This is the case especially if there has been any 
governmental quota set with respect to any diversity dimension.  In fact, since performance 
has been one of the deriving factors that affects investors’ decision in investments, 
therefore, approaching performance with its relationship with board diversity will certainly 
provide insights and attract investors’ interest of how companies will tend to perform if 
diversity has been achieved successfully.  
The study has introduced the executive members’ gender diversity independent 
variable. Although it has not been studied before, it was evident that it affects ROA 
positively from the year 2013 to 2016. This result is critically important especially for 
policy-makers when it comes to identifying characteristics and attributes for nominating 
boardroom members. This is the case especially that the UK Corporate Governance code 
has emphasized on the presence of executive members in the boardroom. It is highly 
believed that narrowing down the criteria of nominating boardroom members to the 
characteristics of each executive members is extremely important and significantly 
impacting firm’s performance that reaps huge economic benefits on the long and short 
term. 
The resource dependency theory facilitated the formation of the hypotheses to relate 
board diversity dimensions to firm performance. However, there were discrepancies 
between the results of the regression analyses in the model and the hypothesized 
relationship between board tenure diversity and performance. These discrepancies should 
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be further investigated in future research to develop a better understanding of this 
relationship from different theoretical perspectives and in different contexts.  
6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
Although this study has provided valuable contributions to the literature concerning 
boardroom diversity and performance. However, some limitations exist.  
First of all, the sample chosen comprised of FTSE 350 companies from the year 
2013 to 2016. Although it represents 13.5% of the companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, it is very minimal compared with the total number of companies in the UK either 
listed or not. This may limit the generalizability of the findings of this study.  
The cross-sectional research design has inherent limitations when it comes to 
causality inference, as it investigates the significance of the relationships between or among 
variables at a particular point of time but does not help to determine the cause and effect. 
Although the study attempted to extend the analysis over a long period, the results should 
be interpreted with caution in the light of the limitations of its methodology.  
The inclusion of the financial and non-financial companies in the regression model 
may result in inaccurate results because of the different nature of the financial sector’s 
operations and the special regulations of this sector. These difference may make the 
computation and the interpretation of leverage for instance different from companies in the 
non-financial situation. Furthermore, this study did not address the endogenity issue. 
Therefore, the results have to be interpreted with caution because no endogeneity test has 
been performed. In other words, the relationship between the dependent and the 
independent variables would work the other way around, where the dependent variable 
would influence the independent variables not vice versa. 
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Additionally, different theoretical perspectives have been used in the literature to 
study this topic, including gender role theory, agency theory, and resource dependency 
theory. Future studies can use these theories and adopt different methodologies and 
research designs to capture the relationship between diversity’s impact on firm 
performance from different perspectives. Furthermore, future studies can also include 
further independent and control variables that will help in increasing the value of the 
coefficient of determination and hence, the validity of the model and our understanding of 
the effect of diversity on performance. Some examples of the important control variables 
may include the ownership structure, risk and liquidity. Finally, further studies can use 
different methodologies for categorizing the industry sectors, providing more insights into 
how different organizations in different sectors or industries react to diversity issues and 
how this relates to performance.  
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Fagan, C. and Gonzáles Menéndez, M.C. (2012). Conclusions. In C. Fagan, M.C. González 
Menéndez, & S. Gómez Ansón (Eds) Women on corporate boards and in top 
management (pp. 245–58). London: Palgrave. 
Farhat, A. (2014). Corporate governance and firm performance: The case of UK. Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Portsmouth. 
Financial Reporting Council (2012). The UK corporate governance code. Retrieved from: 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/ca7e94c4-b9a9-49e2-a824-
ad76a322873c/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-April-2016.pdf  
Finkelstein, S., & D’aveni, R. A. (1994). CEO duality as a double-edged sword: How 
boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. 
Academy of Management Journal 37(5), 1079–1108.  
Florackis, C., Kostakis, A., & Ozkan, A. (2009). Managerial ownership and performance. 
Journal of Business Research 62, 1350–1357.  
Florackis, C., & Ozkan, A. (2009). Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: Evidence 
from the United Kingdom. Accounting & Finance 49, 531–553.  
Forbes, D. P., & Milliken, F. J. (1999). Cognition and corporate governance: 
Understanding boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups. Academy 
of Management Review 24, 489–505.  
Foster, D. D. (2008). Unity out of diversity: The origins and development of the University 
of Humberside. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. 
  
   
85 
 
Ferri, M. G. & Jones, W. H., 1979. Determinants of financial structure: A new 
methodological approach. The Journal of Finance, 34(3), 631–644.  
GrantThornton. (2017). Corporate governance review 2016. Retrieved from 
https://www.grantthornton.co.uk/globalassets/1.-member-firms/united-
kingdom/pdf/publication/2016/2016-corporate-governance-review.pdf 
Garratt, B. (1997). The fish rots from the head. London: HarperCollins. 
Gordini, N., & Rancati, E. (2017). Gender diversity in the Italian boardroom and firm 
financial performance. Management Research Review 40(1), 75–94.  
Grosvold, J., Brammer, S., & Rayton, B. (2007). Board diversity in the United Kingdom 
and Norway: An exploratory analysis. Business Ethics: A European Review, 16(4), 
344–357. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8608.2007.00508.x 
Guest, P. (2009). The impact of board size on firm performance: evidence from the UK. 
The European Journal of Finance 15(4), 385–404. 
Hafsi, T., & Turgut, . (2013). Boardroom diversity and its effect on social performance: 
Conceptualization and empirical evidence. Journal of Business Ethics 112(3), 463–
479. 
Hair, J. F., Ringle, C. M., & Sarstedt, M. (2011). PLS-SEM: Indeed a silver bullet. Journal 
of Marketing Theory and Practice 19(2), 139–152. 
Hambrick, D.C., Cho, T.S. & Chen, M.J. (1996). The influence of top management teams 
heterogeneity on firms’ competitive moves. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
41:4, 659–684.  
  
   
86 
 
Harrison, D. A., & Klein, K. J. (2007). What’s the difference? Diversity constructs as 
separation, variety, or disparity in organizations. Academy of Management Review 
32(4), 1199–1228.  
Hassan, R., Marimuthu, M., & Johl, S. K. (2016). Women on boards and market 
performance: An exploratory study on the listed companies. International Business 
Management 10(2), 84–91. 
Headworth, S., Nelson, R. L., Dinovitzer, R., & Wilkins, D. B. (Eds.). (2016). Diversity in 
Practice. Cambridge University Press. 
Herrmann, P., & Datta, D. K. (2005). Relationships between top management team 
characteristics and international diversification: An empirical investigation. British 
Journal of Management 16(1), 69–78. 
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating 
agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review 
28(3), 383–396. 
Hillman, A.J. and Cannella, A.A. (2007), Organizational predictors of women on corporate 
boards. Academy of Management Journal 50(4), 941–952.  
Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., & Harris, I. C. (2002). Women and racial minorities in the 
boardroom: How do directors differ? Journal of Management 28(6), 747–763.  
Hillman, A.J., Cannella, A.A. and Paetzold, R.L. (2000). The resource dependence role of 
corporate directors: Strategic adaptation of board composition in response to 
environmental change. Journal of Management Studies 37(2), 235–256.  
  
   
87 
 
Hoang, T. C., Abeysekera, I., & Ma, S. (2017). The effect of board diversity on earnings 
quality: An empirical study of listed firms in Vietnam. Australian Accounting 
Review 27(2), 146–163. doi:10.1111/auar.12128 
Huang, S., & Hilary, G. (2018). Zombie boards: Board tenure and firm performance. 
Journal of Accounting Research, in press. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2302917 
Huse, M. and Solberg, A.G. (2006). Gender-related boardroom dynamics: how 
Scandinavian women make and can make contributions on corporate boards. 
Women in Management Review21(2) 113–130.  
Hutchinson, M. (2002). An analysis of the association between firms' investment 
opportunities, board composition and firm performance. Asia-Pacific Journal of 
Accounting & Economics 9(1), 17–38. 
Ibarra, H. (1992). Homophily and differential returns: Sex differences in network structure 
and access in an advertising firm. Administrative Science Quarterly 37, 422–447.  
Ibarra, H. (1993). Personal networks of women and minorities in management: A 
conceptual framework. Academy of Management Review 18, 56–87.  
Ikaheimo, S., Kjellman, A., Holmberg, J., & Sari Jussila, S. (2004). Employee stock option 
plans and stock market reaction: Evidence from Finland. European Journal of 
Finance 10, 105–122.  
Isidro, H. and Sobral, M. (2014). The effects of women on corporate boards on firm value, 
financial performance, and ethical and social compliance. Journal of Business 
Ethics 132 (1), 1–19.  
Jamali, D., Safieddine, A., & Daouk, M. (2007). Corporate governance and women: an 
empirical study of top and middle women managers in the Lebanese banking 
  
   
88 
 
sector. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in 
society, 7(5), 574-585. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4), 305–360. 
Joecks, J., Pull, K., & Vetter, K. (2013). Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm 
performance: What exactly constitutes a "critical mass?" Journal of Business Ethics 
118(1), 61–72. 
John, K. & Senbet, L. W. (1998). Corporate governance and board effectiveness. Journal 
of Banking & Finance 22(4), 371–403.  
Jubilee, R. V. W., Khong, R. W., & Hung, W. T. (2018). Would diversified corporate 
boards add value? The case of banking institutions in Malaysia. Asia-Pacific 
Journal of Business Administration, 10(2/3), 218-228. 
Kagzi, M., & Guha, M. (2018). Board demographic diversity: a review of 
literature. Journal of Strategy and Management, 11(1), 33-51. 
Katrutsa, A., & Strijov, V. (2017). Comprehensive study of feature selection methods to 
solve multicollinearity problem according to evaluation criteria. Expert Systems 
with Applications 76, 1–11. 
Keasey, K., Thompson, S., & Wright, M. (Eds.) (1997). Corporate governance: 
Economics, management and financial issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Kesner, I. F. (1988). Directors’ characteristics and committee membership: An 
investigation of type, occupation, tenure, and gender. Academy of Management 
Journal 31, 66–84.  
  
   
89 
 
Kiliç, M., & Kuzey, C. (2016). The effect of board gender diversity on firm performance: 
Evidence from Turkey. Gender in Management 31(7), 434–455.  
Kim, H., & Lim, C. (2010). Diversity, outside directors and firm valuation: Korean 
evidence. Journal of Business Research 63, 284–291. 
Knight, D., Pearce, C.L., Smith, K.G., Olian, J.D., Sims, H.P., Smit, K.A. & Flood, P. 
(1999). Top management diversity, group process and strategic consensus. 
Strategic Management Journal 20(5), 445–465. 
Kuczynski, S. (1999). If diversity, then higher profits? HR Magazine 44, 66–74.  
Le Breton-Miller, I. & Miller, D. (2006). Why do some family businesses out-compete? 
Governance, long- term orientations, and sustainable capability. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 30, 731–746.  
Leedy, P. D. (1993). Practical research: planning and design. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.  
Lefort, F., & Urzúa, F. (2008). Board independence, firm performance and ownership 
concentration: Evidence from Chile. Journal of Business Research 61, 615–622. 
Lenard J., M., Yu, B., York, E A., & Wu, S. (2014). Impact of board gender diversity on 
firm risk. Managerial Finance 40(8), 787–803.  
Levin, K. A. (2006). Study design III: Cross-sectional studies. Evidence-Based Dentistry 
7(1), 24–25. doi:10.1038/sj.ebd.6400375 
Lorsch, J. (1995). Empowering the board. Harvard Business Review73(1). 107–117.  
Liu, Y., Wei, Z. & Xie, F. (2013). Do women directors improve firm performance in 
China? Journal of Corporate Finance 28, 169–184.  
  
   
90 
 
Li, J., Zhao, F., Chen, S., Jiang, W., Liu, T., & Shi, S. (2017). Gender diversity on boards 
and firms’ environmental policy. Business Strategy and the Environment 26(3), 
306–315. 
Li, J., Zhang, Y., Chen, S., Jiang, W., Wen, S., & Hu, Y. (2018). Demographic diversity 
on boards and employer/employee relationship. Employee Relations 40(2), 298–
312. 
Lückerath-Rovers, M. (2013). Women on boards and firm performance. Journal of 
Management and Governance17(2): 491–509.  
Low, D. C., Roberts, H., & Whiting, R. H. (2015). Board gender diversity and firm 
performance: Empirical evidence from Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia and 
Singapore. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 35, 381–401. 
doi:10.1016/j.pacfin.2015.02.008 
Mahadeo, J. D., Soobaroyen, T., & Hanuman, V. O. (2012). Board composition and 
financial performance: Uncovering the effects of diversity in an emerging 
economy. Journal of Business Ethics 105(3), 375–388. 
Martin, L. M., Warren-Smith, I., Scott, J. M., & Roper, S. (2008). Boards of directors and 
gender diversity in UK companies. Gender in Management 23(3), 194–208.  
Marinova, J., Plantenga, J., & Remery, C. (2016). Gender diversity and firm performance: 
evidence from Dutch and Danish boardrooms. The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 27(15), 1777-1790.  
Mattis, M.C. (2000). Women corporate directors in the United States. In R.J. Burke & M.C. 
Mattis (Eds.), Women on corporate boards of directors: International challenges 
and opportunity. (pp. 43–56). Dordrecht: Kluwer.  
  
   
91 
 
Maury, B. (2006). Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from 
Western European corporations. Journal of Corporate Finance 12, 321–341. 
Mehr-un-Nisa, M. N., & Nishat, M. (2011). The determinants of stock prices in Pakistan. 
Asian Economic and Financial Review 1(4), 276–291. 
Mishra, R. K., & Jhunjhunwala, S. (2013). Diversity and the effective corporate board. 
Burlington: Elsevier Science. 
Moulin, Y. and Point, S. (2012) Les femmes dans les conseils d’administration du SBF120: 
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